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DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AND REGULATORY STABILITY
CAROLINE CECOT†
ABSTRACT
Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) has faced significant opposition
during most of its tenure as an influential agency decisionmaking tool.
As advancements have been made in CBA practice, especially in more
complete monetization of relevant effects, CBA has been gaining
acceptance as an essential part of reasoned agency decisionmaking.
When carefully conducted, CBA promotes transparency and
accountability, efficient and predictable policies, and targeted
retrospective review.
This Article highlights an underappreciated additional effect of
extensive use of CBA to support agency rulemaking: reasonable
regulatory stability. In particular, a regulation based on a wellsupported CBA is more difficult to modify for at least two reasons. The
first reason relates to judicial review. Courts take a “hard look” at
agency findings of fact, which are summarized in a CBA, and they
require justifications when an agency changes course in ways that
contradict its previous factfinding. A prior CBA provides a powerful
reference point; any updated CBA supporting a new course of action
will naturally be compared against the prior CBA, and the agency will
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need to explain any changes in CBA inputs, assumptions, and
methodology. The second reason relates to the nature of CBA. By
focusing on the incremental costs and benefits of a proposed change,
CBA can make it difficult for an agency to justify changing course,
especially when stakeholders have already relied on the prior policy.
Together, these forces constrain the range of changes that agencies
could rationally support. CBA thus promotes regulatory stability
around transparent and increasingly efficient policies.
But, admittedly, this CBA-based stabilizing influence gives rise to
several objections. This Article responds to, among others, concerns
about democratic accountability and, most importantly, the use of
alternative methods of policy modification. Overall, the Article
concludes that CBA and judicial review of CBA play a desirable role
in stabilizing regulatory policy across presidential administrations.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2015, President Barack Obama unveiled the longanticipated Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”).1 The CPP would regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from existing power plants pursuant to the Clean Air Act.
The rule was supported by hundreds of pages of technical analysis of
the CPP’s expected costs and benefits—an analysis referred to as a
cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”).2 According to the CBA, the rule’s
benefits to society would dwarf its costs. Society would be significantly
better off under the CPP to the tune of $22.6 billion worth of net health
and safety benefits each year in likely scenarios.3
But elections have consequences—and President Donald Trump
was elected in part based on his campaign promises to rescind, modify,
and repeal many Obama-era regulations, especially energy and
environmental regulations such as the CPP.4 In his first few months in
office, President Trump issued several executive orders directing
agencies to follow through on those promises.5 On the chopping block
were several EPA regulations, including the Waters of the United

1. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R, pt. 60).
2. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN POWER PLAN FINAL
RULE, EPA-452/R-15-003 (Aug. 2015). Such an analysis is also referred to as a benefit-cost
analysis, or BCA.
3. This number represents the midpoint of the mass-based 2025 annual net monetized
benefits estimate included in the Rule’s Federal Register notice, using a 3 percent discount rate
and reflecting 2016 dollars updated according to the Consumer Price Index.
4. See Press Release, Donald J. Trump, Donald Trump’s Contract with the American Voter
(Oct.
22,
2016),
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316Contractv02.pdf [https://perma.cc/98VH-BWGJ].
5. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017); Exec. Order No.
13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1,
2017).
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States Rule,6 the Methane 111(b) Rule,7 the Landfill Rule,8 the Steam
Electric Effluent Limitation Guidelines Final Rule,9 and the Risk
Management Plan Rule Amendments.10 According to their CBAs,
these rules were expected to provide at least $350 million in net
monetized benefits to society each year.11
Making good on President Trump’s most famous repeal promise,
EPA revealed its proposed repeal of the CPP in October 2017.12 It, too,
was accompanied by a long CBA, one that summarized the expected
costs and benefits of repealing the CPP.13 According to the new
analysis, repealing the CPP would, most likely, not benefit society. In
fact, society would lose out on billions of dollars’ worth of
environmental and health benefits under most scenarios.14 Notably,
6. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.). EPA has
proposed repeal of this rule, see Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of
Pre-Existing Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328 and scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.), and proposed a revised rule to take its place, see Revised
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019).
7. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified
Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (currently stayed
at 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730).
8. Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed.
Reg. 59,276 (Aug. 29, 2016); 81 Fed. Reg. 59,331 (Aug. 29, 2016) (currently stayed at 82 Fed. Reg.
24,878).
9. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating
Point Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,838 (Nov. 3, 2015) (currently stayed).
10. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4,594 (Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). EPA has
proposed repeal of this rule. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,850 (May 30, 2018) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68).
11. The net-benefit estimates are calculated by taking the midpoint of the net-benefits range
included in the Rule’s Federal Register notice, using a 3 percent discount rate where possible and
reflecting 2016 dollars updated according to the Consumer Price Index. The numbers do not
include unquantified benefits, which were often deemed “important” in the CBA notwithstanding
the agency’s failure to quantify or monetize them. See, e.g., Accidental Release Prevention
Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4,594, 4,598
(EPA Jan. 13, 2017) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68) (“However, the monetized impacts omit many
important categories of accident impacts including lost productivity, the costs of emergency
response, transaction costs, property value impacts in the surrounding community (that overlap
with other benefit categories), and environmental impacts.”).
12. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia;
Amendment to Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
13. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE REVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER
PLAN: PROPOSAL, EPA-452/R-17-004 (Oct. 2017).
14. Id. at 13.
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however, the estimated net losses of repeal were calculated to be
significantly lower than the net benefits initially calculated by President
Obama’s EPA. That is because President Trump’s EPA made some
changes to the prior CBA’s assumptions and inputs. Already, this new
CBA has been criticized in the press as exaggerating the costs and
diminishing the benefits of the regulation.15 And, once finalized, the
repeal of the CPP will likely be challenged in court as demonstrating
EPA’s “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisionmaking.16 When that
happens, courts will compare the Trump EPA’s CBA to the Obama
EPA’s CBA. And, importantly, courts will require the Trump EPA to
explain its changes. The difficulty of this task will depend in part on
how well reasoned and complete the original, Obama-era CBA was. If
the new CBA does not withstand challenges to its new scope,
methodology, or assumptions, then it could undermine the agency’s
entire reasoning for the new rule and lead to judicial vacatur.
This example highlights a surprising obstacle to at least some of
the Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda—CBA. Previously,
CBA has been characterized as a deregulatory tool that slows down or
blocks regulation.17 CBA has also been described as one of the means
of presidential control of agency action.18 Both characterizations
suggest that CBA could facilitate an administration’s deregulatory
agenda. But, actually, CBA—which, at its best, reflects rational
decisionmaking—does not fit neatly into either of these categories.
Administrative law has developed certain rules ensuring that
when agencies change course based on a new assessment of underlying

15. See, e.g., Karl Hausker, The Flawed Analysis Behind Trump Administration’s Proposed
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.wri.org/
blog/2017/10/flawed-analysis-behind-trump-administrations-proposed-repeal-clean-powerplan [https://perma.cc/JM3M-63PQ]; Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, The E.P.A.’s Smoke and
Mirrors on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/09/opinion/environmental-protection-obama-pruitt.html [https://perma.cc/4AK7-FLVG].
16. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
17. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 1003–04 (2015); see also Marc Granetz, Deregulation Rodeo:
Reagan’s Rulebusters Get Ready to Ride, NEW REPUBLIC 9–12 (Nov. 12, 1984); David Hoffman,
Election ’84: The Reagan Record, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1984, at A6.
18. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–86
(2001); see generally Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (discussing how
procedural requirements can facilitate political control by Congress and the president); Eric A.
Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (analyzing “cost-benefit analysis as a method by which the
President, Congress, or the judiciary controls agency behavior”).
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facts, they provide a reasonable explanation for the change.19 This
requirement protects reliance interests and ensures good governance.20
A CBA, in essence, provides a summary of the underlying facts that
support an agency’s decision. In this context, the existence of CBAs
supporting the original rules—which I refer to as “prior CBAs”—poses
unique challenges for a new administration’s efforts to repeal, rescind,
or modify rules. In particular, for each CBA-supported policy or rule
that Trump-era agencies decide to repeal, rescind, or modify, they will
need to produce new CBAs,21 and those CBAs will be scrutinized by
courts for their reasonableness.22
Although courts typically give deference to agency CBAs in the
first instance,23 any new CBA will be judged against a prior CBA in the
administrative record. This comparison will highlight the changes
made by the agency in justifying the new rule, and each change requires
explanation. Many Obama-era regulations that have been targeted for
repeal by the Trump administration were supported by CBAs that
demonstrated large net benefits to society overall. Trump-era agencies
will have to ground their modifications in scientific evidence that
supports different input values, in changed conditions that motivate
different methodological assumptions, or in transparent disagreements
on policy. Although some inputs that make up a high-quality CBA
19. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983). For a comprehensive
discussion about administrative law rules that apply to deregulation and about the abuse of those
rules under the Trump administration, see generally Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond,
The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651 (2019); Bethany A.
Davis Noll & Denise A. Grab, Deregulation: Process and Procedures that Govern Agency
Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks, 38 ENERGY L.J. 269 (2017). Of course, these
administrative law constraints do not apply to Congress. In 2017, Congress used the Congressional
Review Act to eliminate fourteen Obama-era rules, notwithstanding CBA. See Dylan Scott, The
New Republican Plan to Deregulation America, Explained, VOX (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:30am EDT),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-act-whatregulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/38RK-EED3].
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. Under Executive Order No. 12,866, executive agencies are required to conduct CBA for
significant regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). If a regulation required
CBA, then its repeal will generally also require CBA.
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
23. See Caroline Cecot & W. Kip Viscusi, Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 592–605 (2015). For one account of how judicial review of agency
procedures can improve decisionmaking, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761–62 (2007). See Dylan Scott, The New
Republican Plan to Deregulation America, Explained, VOX (Apr. 25, 2018, 9:30am EDT),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-review-act-whatregulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/38RK-EED3].
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might be subject to reasonable disagreement, there are many inputs
that would be difficult to alter, given current scientific consensus. In
the CPP, for example, the Trump EPA might be able to lower the value
of carbon-emission reductions—an input referred to as the “social cost
of carbon”—so that the number reflects only the benefits of reducing
carbon emissions in the United States.24 The Trump EPA cannot,
however, estimate the value at zero.25 In this way, a well-supported,
high-quality CBA—a conduit for presidential oversight and control
once thought to be simply a hindrance to issuing regulations—becomes
an obstacle to repealing regulations by presidential fiat.
This Article highlights an underappreciated additional effect of
extensive use of CBA to support agency rulemaking: reasonable
regulatory stability.26 Scholars have argued that agency procedures,
especially when reviewed by courts, have significant costs—for
example, they can constrain responsiveness and delay action—that
might outweigh any benefits those procedures have in improving
decisionmaking.27 Simply put, the argument is that the potential for
24. See, e.g., Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change
Policy Benefits in U.S. Regulatory Analyses: Domestic versus Global Approaches, 10 REV. ENVTL.
ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1–19 (2016); Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Think Global: International
Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203, 203–
95 (2017); Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371,
371–421 (2015).
25. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) cannot value
carbon-emission reductions at zero without explaining its reasoning); Endangerment and Cause
or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,496, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I) (“The Administrator finds that
six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare
of current and future generations.”).
26. Recently, Aaron L. Nielson made a similar argument about the unsung benefits of
ossification, though without focusing on the role of CBA in particular. See Aaron L. Nielson,
Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 90–93 (2018). For other related literature, see Nina A.
Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President
Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 616–60 (2003) (arguing that there are benefits to agency
“entrenchment” or “burrowing” actions before a new administration, such as “midnight”
rulemaking and late-term hiring); Stuart Shapiro, Embracing Ossification, 41 REG. 8, 10 (20182019) (arguing that views about the benefits of ossification depend on whether one’s regulatory
preferences align with the administration’s preferences); William W. Buzbee, The Tethered
President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1390–1412
(2018) (describing how various doctrines in administrative law promote regulatory stability).
27. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 128 (2001) (agreeing that detailed judicial scrutiny of agency rationales has
contributed to “ossification” of the regulatory process); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification
Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to
Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2000);
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CBA to constrain agency action is itself a cost of CBA. And that is
undoubtedly true. But this potential to constrain is also a benefit of
CBA. In fact, the benefits of CBA-based constraints are likely to
outweigh their costs.
Unconstrained agency responsiveness could be beneficial, but it
could also be hasty, unpredictable, or unstable. CBA does constrain
some agency action and reduce responsiveness, but the procedure is
likely to strike the right balance by ensuring that any CBA-induced
stabilization takes hold around efficient policies. Reliance on CBA
does not generally freeze regulatory policy because “net-beneficial”
changes could always be made. Further, the idea of net-beneficial
action is a dynamic concept, and what supports such action evolves
based on the available evidence. But a world in which agency
decisionmaking is driven by CBA is necessarily a world in which
potential shifts away from current regulatory policy are more limited,
especially when the existing policy was justified by a high-quality CBA.
A commitment to CBA, then, promotes the development of regulatory
policy in predictable and science-based ways. This focused and
discriminating stickiness—as opposed to stickiness around arbitrary or
unpredictable policies—is likely to be more desirable than
unconstrained agency action. Although an agency that is untethered by
CBA can be more responsive, its actions are less likely to be efficient,
generating significant costs of over- and underregulation. This Article
argues that a commitment to agency CBA promotes beneficial
ossification around reasonable rulemaking.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines CBA and traces its
increasing importance in agency rulemakings. CBA is a
decisionmaking tool that allows regulators to identify welfaremaximizing policies by considering the expected costs and benefits of
implementing the policies and converting those effects into dollar
values.28 Agencies increasingly rely on CBA to support rulemakings,
propelled by their obligations under the Administrative Procedure Act

Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 529–30 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (noting that “it is difficult
to disagree with the conclusion that it is much harder for an agency to promulgate a rule now than
it was twenty years ago”).
28. For a detailed description of CBA and its philosophical origins as a decision procedure,
see MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
1 (2006).
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(“APA”) to act rationally,29 their statutory directives to analyze costs
and benefits,30 and applicable executive orders dating back to President
Ronald Reagan that require agencies to choose welfare-maximizing
regulatory options.31 When carefully conducted, CBA promotes
transparency and accountability, efficient and predictable policies, and
targeted retrospective review.
Parts II and III form the heart of the Article, describing and
applying the constraints that flow from a commitment to CBA-based
policymaking. Part II dives into the special role CBA plays when an
agency changes course. Simply put, the original CBA wields significant
influence. First, judicial review of agency CBA constrains the changes
that are available to that agency. Although courts are generally
deferential when first encountering a CBA, courts are likely to subject
an updated CBA to more scrutiny—not because they are legally
obligated to review a new CBA more thoroughly, but because the prior
CBA acts as an important reference point from which the agency must
explain any changes. The prior CBA, after all, provides a succinct
summary of the underlying facts that the agency previously found
compelling. Second, CBA norms constrain future changes. By design,
CBA highlights the incremental costs and benefits of changing
regulatory stringency. The baseline—or the status quo—is the world
under the original policy. The costs and benefits of, say, repealing that
original policy are different than the costs and benefits of never issuing
that policy in the first place. And, fundamentally, reliance on CBA
means that a proposed policy must have a basis in scientific or other
evidence that justifies the policy. Rules with CBAs that have become
obsolete—whether due to different estimates of health, safety, or
environmental risks and their value or due to different costs associated
with mitigating those risks—are ripe for CBA-based updating. But
more recent CBA-based rules are more difficult to alter in any
dramatic, and still cost-benefit-justified, way because the available
evidence is unlikely to have changed significantly. This effect
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
30. See, e.g., Section 1412 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g–1(b)(3)(C)(i)
(2012) (requiring EPA to calculate the “incremental costs and benefits associated with each
alternative maximum contaminant level considered” and consider these costs and benefits when
establishing a maximum contaminant level); Section 112(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring a comparison of costs and benefits according to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation, see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015)).
31. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19,
1981).

CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1602

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/19/2019 3:26 PM

[Vol. 68:1593

constrains the timing of policy swings, making it less likely that
regulations will swing wildly from one administration to another. Part
III, then, describes how CBA-based constraints could apply to
deregulatory actions under the Trump administration.
Part IV responds to several challenges to the desirability of a
CBA-based stabilizing role. These critiques include concerns that CBA
constraints exacerbate agency bias toward rulemaking, limit agency
flexibility, make elections meaningless, reduce accountability, and
promote deregulation by other means. Most importantly, this Article
addresses whether, in light of CBA-based constraints, an agency might
pursue its goals—regulatory or deregulatory—by avoiding CBA-based
justifications altogether. That is, instead of arguing that its new policy
reflects better standards or decisionmaking, an agency might shift to
arguing about statutory authority—namely, that the arguably “better”
policy, as viewed from a CBA perspective, is not authorized by
Congress. Case in point: EPA is justifying its proposed repeal of the
CPP by arguing that, under its new interpretation of a provision of the
Clean Air Act, the CPP as originally proposed exceeds EPA’s statutory
authority.32 And such arguments have not been limited to the CPP.33
Arguably, instability regarding statutory interpretation is worse than
instability regarding regulatory stringency. But CBA culture is not to
blame for interpretive instability. Moreover, CBA can play a role in
mitigating such instability. Courts give deference to agencies’
interpretations of their own authority, but it is not clear that such
deference should extend to agency interpretations that limit their
ability to promulgate welfare-enhancing policies that would be
allowable under other statutory interpretations. Overall, this Article
argues that CBA’s stabilizing role withstands these criticisms and,
further, that it is likely to reduce concerns about agency bias and
enhance accountability through transparency.

32. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia;
Amendment to Ambient Air Quality Standard for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036 (Oct. 16,
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
33. See, e.g., Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing
Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.).
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I. AGENCY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. Practice
Since 1981, when President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,291,34 all federal executive agencies have conducted CBA, making it
a staple of important U.S. regulatory policy developments. Pursuant to
Reagan’s Order, all “major” rules—that is, all regulations likely to
have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more—must
be accompanied by a CBA.35 CBA is a decisionmaking procedure that
has its origins in welfare economics. Economic theory identifies the
socially desirable level of environmental quality as the level that
maximizes the satisfaction of individual preferences. CBA sheds light
on policies that potentially improve aggregate welfare by converting
gains (the value of the benefits to the beneficiaries) and losses (the
costs to those who are burdened) into a monetary scale.36 In fact,
Reagan’s Order required agencies to choose the regulatory objective
that, according to the analysis, “maximize[d] the net benefits to
society.”37 The Reagan administration hoped that CBA would support
President Reagan’s deregulatory agenda by preventing the issuance of
regulations, most of which were thought to be net costly.38
Not surprisingly, given the administration’s motivations, Reagan’s
CBA requirement was met with considerable criticism and skepticism
from scholars and proregulatory groups.39 In particular, because many
health and environmental regulations affect nonmarket goods, there
was real concern that these hard-to-value benefits would be
underestimated—or not estimated at all.40 In the view of these skeptics,
CBA—or, at least, incomplete and poorly conducted CBA—would

34. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
35. Id. § 1(b). The currently applicable order, Executive Order 12,866, applies CBA to
“[s]ignificant regulatory action[s],” defined as those that “have an annual effect on the economy
of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy,” among other things.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
36. CBA identifies the Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy as the one that maximizes the difference
between the value of the gains to the winners and the losses to the losers without requiring the
winners to compensate the losers.
37. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
38. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH
(2008).
39. See Granetz, supra note 17; Hoffman, supra note 17.
40. See, e.g., Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REG. 33, 35–36,
38–40 (1981).
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prevent agencies from issuing regulations that would actually be
beneficial. The early CBAs, which left large categories of benefits
unquantified, appeared to confirm some of these fears.41 But it is
unclear how much agencies actually relied on these CBAs and whether
it would have been sensible for them to do so. And, in at least a few
cases, early well-supported CBAs actually convinced regulators to
issue more stringent regulations.42 Moreover, CBA made the
regulatory process more transparent.
Perhaps that is why President Bill Clinton did not abandon the
CBA requirement. He did, however, replace Reagan’s Order with his
own—Executive Order 12,866.43 Like Executive Order 12,291,
Clinton’s Order encouraged agencies to “select those approaches that
maximize net benefits . . . to the extent permitted by law.”44 Clinton’s
Order also placed more emphasis on accountability, providing several
additional ways that transparency would be preserved during the
White House review process.45 Further, it explicitly recognized “that
some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify.”46
President Clinton’s version of White House review of CBA
requirements has had staying power. Presidents George W. Bush and
Obama retained Clinton’s Order, though issuing their own
supplements,47 and so far, President Trump has reaffirmed the Order’s
goals of ensuring that regulations are net beneficial.48 Over the course
41. See generally Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S.
Government Do Benefit-Cost Analysis?, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 192 (2007) (examining
“how benefit-cost analysis is actually performed by U.S. government agencies” by assessing CBAs
of EPA regulations from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations).
42. One example is the Reagan administration’s imposition of a stricter standard for phasing
out lead in gasoline based on the results of CBA. See Statement of Christopher DeMuth, in
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980S 508 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1994) (“A very fine piece
of analysis persuaded everyone that the health harms of leaded gasoline were far greater than we
had thought, and we ended up adopting a much tighter program than the one we had inherited.”).
For more information about that CBA and the resulting standard, see Albert L. Nichols, Lead in
Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49–86 (Richard
D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
43. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
44. Id. § 1.
45. Id. § 6(b).
46. Id. § 1(b)(6).
47. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72
Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 23, 2007), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Feb. 4,
2009).
48. See Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017). That said, President
Trump has directed agencies to fulfill additional requirements, such as repealing at least two
existing regulations before issuing a new regulation and imposing a regulatory budget that caps
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of a few decades, CBA has, in large part, shed its antiregulatory
association. It has instead emerged as one of several tools for
presidential oversight of agencies—in particular, one that promotes
transparency and rational agency decisionmaking.
Although there is no counterfactual against which to measure
CBA’s effect, reliance on CBA does not seem to have deterred the
issuance of net-beneficial regulation. For one, great strides have been
made in valuation methodology, significantly improving the quality of
benefit estimates overall and especially in the environmental context.49
In recent years, CBA has been effectively used to justify many
stringent environmental regulations, including those aimed at
mitigating climate change; this development has led some skeptics to
at least tentatively accept the technique.50 Under the Obama
administration, agencies such as EPA, the Department of Energy
(“DOE”), and the Department of the Interior (“DOI”) conducted
CBAs in which quantified and monetized benefits outweighed the
costs. In particular, over the eight years of the Obama administration,
these agencies issued significant rules in which monetized benefits
greatly exceeded monetized costs.51
These developments all took place largely without Congress’s
explicit endorsement, but there is some evidence that Congress, too,
has embraced the role of CBA in agency decisionmaking, at least in
recent years. For example, a 2017 bill considered by Congress would
have, among other things, codified requirements for CBA in most
agency rulemakings.52 At least on the CBA issue, there appears to have
been bipartisan support.53 In addition, during confirmation hearings for
total incremental regulatory costs. These additional requirements are unlikely to improve welfare
and might hinder some of the goals of CBA. See generally Caroline Cecot & Michael A.
Livermore, The One In, Two Out Executive Order Is a Zero, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017)
(evaluating the effectiveness of the one-in, two-out policy in helping agencies be fiscally efficient).
49. See Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1436–
50 (2014) (noting improvements in the ability of CBA to quantify previously unquantifiable
benefits).
50. See generally REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 38 (describing how several
environmental groups have embraced CBA).
51. For details, see reports to Congress issued by the Obama administration. OIRA Reports
to Congress, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/informationregulatory-affairs/reports/#ORC [https://perma.cc/9XSS-S5BA]. Still, a large percentage of
Obama-era rules had missing cost or benefit estimates.
52. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017).
53. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, A Regulatory Reform Bill That Everyone Should Like,
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-0622/a-regulatory-reform-bill-that-everyone-should-like [https://perma.cc/K3AD-APK3]. Other
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the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”), senators no longer questioned the legitimacy of White
House–mandated CBA review. In fact, during the June 2017
confirmation hearing of Administrator Neomi Rao, the hardest-hitting
questions from Senator Heidi Heitkamp, Democrat from North
Dakota, were about demanding rigorous CBAs from federal agencies,
even for deregulatory actions.54
B. Nuts and Bolts
What explains the staying power of CBA in guiding agency
decisionmaking? No doubt, all presidents appreciate the review
process for oversight purposes. But part of CBA’s appeal for regulators
is that it provides a clear methodology for achieving various statutory
directives in light of difficult tradeoffs, especially when the underlying
statutes require agencies to consider these tradeoffs in some way. In
particular, when a statute gives an agency authority to manage a certain
risk, the key decision for regulators is often the degree of risk reduction
to require through regulation. This decision invariably requires trading
off the costs of additional risk reduction with the benefits of such
reduction. Congress sometimes determines how this tradeoff should be
made; in some statutes, Congress requires maximum risk reduction,55
all feasible risk reduction,56 or cost-benefit-justified risk reduction.57
Often, however, legislation leaves these risk-management details to the
agency, relying on the agency to decide what regulatory stringency is
“requisite,” “appropriate,” or “necessary” to fulfilling Congress’s

features of the Act have been more controversial. For more information, see the essays published
on this topic in the Regulatory Review’s series, Assessing the Regulatory Accountability Act.
Assessing the Regulatory Accountability Act, REG. REV. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/30/assessing-regulatory-accountability-act
[https://
perma.cc/B5UA-R9HK].
54. Heitkamp Questions to Rao, C-SPAN (June 7, 2017), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4672872/heitkamp-questions-neomi-rao [https://perma.cc/XGG2-KTQ8].
55. E.g., “Delaney Clause,” Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929,
§ 409(c)(3)(A), 72 Stat. 1784, 1786 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2012) and scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
56. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (requiring the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to “set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that
no employee will suffer material” health impairment).
57. E.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i) (2012) (allowing the
Administrator to set a contaminant level that maximizes health-risk-reduction benefits at a cost
that is justified by the benefits).

CECOT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

4/19/2019 3:26 PM

DEREGULATORY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

1607

objective of, say, “protect[ing] health and welfare.”58 Such language
has been held to allow—and, in some statutes, require—the use of
CBA to inform regulatory stringency.59 CBA has many desirable
features, including forcing the agency to make relevant tradeoffs
transparent, pointing to a particular level of regulatory stringency, and
providing a succinct summary of the basis for the agency’s decision.60
In fact, courts increasingly view conducting some form of CBA as
engaging in the basic rational decisionmaking that is required by the
APA.61 For these reasons, agencies routinely conduct CBA and rely on
its insights when their statutory mandates permit them to do so.62
CBA requires agencies to explicitly list, quantify, and monetize
the effects—positive and negative—of a proposed regulation as
compared to the status quo and other alternatives. The estimated costs
are largely regulatory compliance costs, which approximate the social
or opportunity costs of regulation. Social benefits, meanwhile, may
include health improvements from cleaner air or water. An agency
would proceed with a rule that requires a certain level of stringency
when the additional benefits of the rule justify the additional costs of
moving away from the status quo.

58. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012) (governing the establishment of national ambientair-quality standards under the Clean Air Act).
59. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that “the phrase
‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost”).
60. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussing an
early EPA CBA of standards issued under the Clean Water Act, which made transparent the
agency’s weighing of benefits in the form of lower biochemical oxygen demand levels in water
against compliance costs estimated to close eight mills and leading to 1,800 people laid off). Of
course, it is possible that while the agency’s stated motivation is based on the CBA, its true
motivation is not. If so, it might be argued that CBA makes the agency’s true reasoning less
transparent. But if the agency asserts reliance on the CBA, then the soundness of the CBA is
what is ultimately relevant. This is because a reviewing court may uphold an agency’s action only
on the grounds upon which the agency purportedly relied when it acted. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); see generally Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery,
116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007) (discussing how the Chenery principle promotes transparency and
accountability).
61. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (noting that where CBA is authorized but not required, agencies typically
must now provide nonarbitrary reasons for failing to consider CBA). But see Amy Sinden, A
“Cost-Benefit State”? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 46 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10933, 10934 (2016) (noting a gap between the kind of CBA the Supreme
Court has endorsed and the mode of CBA identified and advocated by Cass R. Sunstein).
62. Executive Order 12,866’s CBA requirements technically extend only to executive
agencies. However, independent agencies must still adhere to their statutory mandates and the
APA when conducting rulemaking, and their rules must withstand judicial review. These forces
will continue to push them to conduct and rely on CBA in decisionmaking.
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For many regulations, these benefits are the monetized value of,
say, having a cleaner environment or a safer workplace.63 To value such
environmental, health, and safety benefits, economists estimate
society’s willingness to pay to reduce these risks.64 These estimates are
typically based on revealed-preference studies. For example, EPA has
adopted a “value of a statistical life” (“VSL”) measure to place a
monetary value on reductions in mortality risk.65 VSL is calculated
using information about workers’ wage-risk tradeoffs in the labor
market.66 Generally speaking, the benefits associated with the
reduction of these risks make up the largest component of all
regulatory benefits. A similar type of revealed-preference
methodology has been used to value local environmental amenities by
analyzing how property values change as the environmental attributes
of otherwise comparable properties change.67 Where revealedpreference studies cannot be carried out, economists have relied on
stated-preference surveys that obtain individuals’ willingness to pay or
accept specific risk changes based on their answers to hypothetical
scenarios.68
The costs, in turn, would ideally be measured as the losses implied
by the increased prices that the regulation causes. Typically, however,
agencies estimate direct compliance costs and some indirect costs as
proxies for these losses. In this context, too, there is uncertainty. Direct
compliance costs can be difficult to estimate. When a regulation
embraces flexible compliance methods, it has been particularly difficult
for agencies to measure compliance costs, and they often overestimate
such costs.69

63. See Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE 221, 221 (1996).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29 (2004).
66. Id.
67. See generally Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product
Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974) (discussing how prices change in
relation to spatial and environmental variation).
68. See generally ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS
TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (Resources for the Future,
1989) (assessing survey methods for valuing risk scenarios).
69. See, e.g., Hart Hodges, Falling Prices: Cost of Complying with Environmental Regulations
Almost Always Less Than Advertised, Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper (1997) (finding that the
cost of compliance is often lower than estimated).
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A complete CBA quantifies and monetizes all important costs and
benefits. Of course, qualitative assessment is a valid and important
aspect of CBA, as it recognizes that monetization is not always
possible, given the state of research.70 Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866
explicitly recognizes the role of unquantified costs and benefits in highquality CBA.71 But for CBA to be most useful, agencies should
quantify and monetize effects to the extent possible.72 For this reason,
CBA has been most controversial when it is applied to effects that are
difficult to quantify or monetize.
Over time, the set of unquantified effects gets ever smaller as
research into impacts improves. When EPA first set out to monetize
the health and welfare benefits associated with reducing air pollutants,
for example, its task was not easy. But the analyses have improved over
the years due to developments in underlying studies, and the agency
now routinely monetizes a wide variety of costs and benefits, even
those that were once thought unquantifiable.73
A high-quality CBA not only quantifies and monetizes effects but
also does so based on the best available scientific evidence, making
reasonable and transparent assumptions and policy-based decisions.74
In contrast, a low-quality CBA might rely on problematic studies,
consider few regulatory alternatives, or analyze a small subset of
relevant impacts.75 As with the concept of completeness, the concept of
“high quality” is constantly changing. By design, a CBA must rely on
ex ante estimates of costs and benefits, and these estimates might not
coincide with the actual costs and benefits of the rule once
implemented. As new evidence on the actual effects of a policy

70. See discussion infra Part I.C.
71. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 35, § 1 (“Costs and benefits shall be understood
to include both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated)
and qualitative measures of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless
essential to consider.”).
72. Id.
73. See Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1436
(2014) (“The evolution of regulatory cost-benefit analysis over the past several decades shows
that agencies have eventually come to quantify important categories of benefits that they once
considered nonquantifiable.”).
74. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 590–603 (finding that courts pay attention to these
features when reviewing agency CBA).
75. Id.; see, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting the agency’s CBA for not considering relevant regulatory alternatives and impacts).
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emerges, CBAs that were previously considered high quality when
originally conducted might need to be reevaluated.76
The choice of the “best available” evidence and reasonable
assumptions in the course of estimating costs and benefits can be
fraught with controversy. Consider, for example, the value of reducing
carbon emissions, which is referred to as the “social cost of carbon.”77
Economists have developed integrated assessment models that link
greenhouse gas emissions, temperature changes, and monetary
damages, but there is still considerable uncertainty surrounding the
accuracy of the models’ estimates.78 Notwithstanding their flaws,
estimates from these models are likely the best available, and the use
of other methodology would require significant explanation.79 In
addition, valuing greenhouse gas reductions raises controversial
normative questions that include the appropriate discount rate,80 the
treatment of catastrophic risk,81 and the use of global damages.82 In
these debates, there are reasonable arguments in support of different
perspectives, and multiple moves are likely supportable. But even in

76. See generally Jonathan B. Wiener & Daniel L. Ribeiro, Environmental Regulation Going
Retro: Learning Foresight from Hindsight, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2016) (suggesting that
forward-looking analyses can be improved by considering the shortcomings of past projections of
the future).
77. The social cost of carbon reflects the cost to society of the higher global temperatures
caused by each ton of carbon emitted into the atmosphere. See generally INTERAGENCY
WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (2010) (describing the interagency process
of developing estimates of the social cost of carbon).
78. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models Tell Us?, 51 J.
ECON. LIT. 860, 860–62 (2013) (describing disagreements in interpreting models that account for
the social cost of carbon).
79. See Richard Revesz et al., Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases, 357 SCIENCE 655
(2017) (“[G]overnment and private sector analysts should continue using IWG’s central estimate
of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide with confidence that it is still the best estimate of the social cost
of greenhouse gases.”).
80. E.g., Christian Gollier & Martin L. Weitzman, How Should the Distant Future Be
Discounted When Discount Rates Are Uncertain?, 107 ECON. LETTERS 350, 351–52 (2010).
81. E.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 275, 276 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of
measuring the catastrophic risk of climate change due to “[d]eep structural uncertainty [of]
unknown unknowns” and “essentially unlimited downside liability on possible planetary
damages”).
82. E.g., Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 24; Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Think Global:
International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon, 42 COL. J. ENVTL. L.
203 (2017); Arden Rowell, Foreign Impacts and Climate Change, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371
(2015).
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this value-laden area, CBA still serves a salutary role of making any
policy choices transparent.
In light of these methodological and other challenges, some critics
have argued that CBA can be manipulated to justify any goal or
regulation.83 But this is simply not true. Although there is considerable
leeway in estimating the costs and benefits of regulation, given
limitations in scientific studies and different normative considerations,
CBA inputs are not without bounds.84 For example, estimates should
not be based on disreputable studies, especially when reputable studies
are available. Nor should benefits or costs be left unquantified when
there is useful data available. In the case of the social cost of carbon,
for example, an agency might be able to lower the value of carbonemission reductions to reflect only the benefits of reducing carbon
emissions in the United States, but it cannot estimate the value at
zero.85 Studies of agency action support this view of CBA. After
reviewing economic analyses across presidential administrations, Art
Fraas and Richard Morgenstern conclude that the key elements of the
analyses have been “generally insulated from politics,” with
differences “largely in areas for which there is reasonable debate
within the academic community.”86 If the analysis in CBAs is
“rhetoric,” it is constrained rhetoric. Of course, that is not to say that
CBA is completely deterministic and static. Facts on the ground
change, new scientific studies are published, and not all decisions can
be made purely based on the scientific evidence.

83. E.g., Karl Coplan, Pruitt’s Arbitrary Cost Accounting is Built into the Concept of Cost
Benefit Analysis, GREEN L. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://greenlaw.blogs.pace.edu/2017/10/10/pruittsarbitrary-cost-accounting-is-built-into-the-concept-of-cost-benefit-analysis [https://perma.cc/
7UP3-8MNR] (“[T]he manipulability of cost benefit analysis is an inherent feature of an analysis
that seeks to apply monetized accounting concepts to values for which there are no dollar values
and no accounting rules. Which argues against ever relying on cost benefit analysis for regulatory
rulemaking in the first place.”).
84. See Posner, supra note 18, at 1197–98 (arguing that “it is not usually easy to manipulate
cost-benefit data,” though acknowledging that some variables are hard to measure).
85. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that NHTSA cannot value carbon-emission reductions at zero, given scientific evidence, without
explaining its reasoning); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (“The
Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger both the public
health and the public welfare of current and future generations.”).
86. Art Fraas & Richard Morgenstern, Identifying the Analytical Implications of Alternative
Regulatory Philosophies, 5 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 137, 142 (2014).
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C. Benefits of CBA
Generally speaking, agencies conduct CBA to determine whether
to regulate and how stringently to do so. CBA, by its nature, is difficult,
time intensive, and expensive. Agencies make countless decisions
when conducting CBA—from deciding which impacts to measure to
choosing the underlying studies that inform the estimation of impacts.
For complicated rulemakings, the CBA itself can cost millions of
dollars.87
But the procedure has many virtues. In the first instance, it helps
agencies adopt more efficient policies by encouraging real
consideration of policy impacts, thus promoting transparency in agency
science and policy decisions.88 The procedure also incentivizes agencies
to conduct ever better and more complete analysis of costs and
benefits. In addition, it pressures agencies to engage in retrospective
review as a means of gathering the science- or evidence-based
information needed to identify and change prior policies that are no
longer efficient. Thus, increased reliance on CBA not only promotes
rational agency decisionmaking in the first instance but also improves
regulatory policy over time.
1. More Transparency and Accountability. Critics of CBA often
describe it as prone to a dangerous kind of manipulation, where policy
preferences determine outcomes and these preferences are more—not
less—obscured because they hide behind science-based arguments.89
This criticism relies on two assumptions. First, it assumes that if
agencies did not conduct CBA, policy preferences would either not
play a role in the process or be easier to discern. Second, it relies on
CBA being able to justify any predetermined and underlying policy
outcome. Neither assumption is reasonable.
87. As an example, an environmental impact statement, a type of specialized cost-benefit
analysis required under the National Environmental Policy Act, can take between one and six
years to prepare. The analysis can range in cost from $250,000 to $2,000,000. See THE NEPA TASK
FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA
IMPLEMENTATION 65–66 (2003).
88. These features of CBA are enforced by courts under the APA’s “arbitrary or capricious”
standard of review of agency decisionmaking. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23.
89. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 443 (1981) (“[CBA] is arbitrary . . . . The focus on particular problems
legitimates arbitrary assumptions and masks their political content.”); Amy Sinden, Cass
Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 194 (2011)
(book review) (“The danger of CBA . . . lies in its false promise of determinacy, its pretense of
objectivity and scientific accuracy . . . [which] renders CBA . . . vulnerable to manipulation . . . .”).
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Because agency decisionmaking almost always involves making
difficult tradeoffs between costs and benefits, the actual alternative to
conducting CBA is not science-only decisionmaking or transparency
about policy preferences. Instead, the alternative to CBA is making
these policy-laden decisions while largely uninformed about costs and
benefits, usually by pointing vaguely to some statutory directive or by
citing agency expertise. This alternative would not be more
meaningfully transparent than CBA. This alternative would, however,
be more likely to result in decisions that are profoundly misguided. For
example, consider a context in which an agency is not allowed to rely
on CBA: EPA setting air-quality standards for criteria pollutants under
the Clean Air Act.90 EPA cannot openly consider costs, so it engages
in surreptitious and uninformed cost guesswork when deciding what is
sufficient to protect health.91 This guesswork results in a standard that
is less protective than one that CBA would justify.92
Perhaps, then, the concern is that CBA-based decisions do not
actually reflect more informed decisionmaking but receive more
respect than do decisions not based on CBA. In particular, if CBA
could be perfectly manipulated to justify any predetermined policy
outcome, then using CBA to guide decisionmaking is, substantively at
least, no better than acting on policy preferences without any analysis.
But the decisions might falsely seem more informed.
CBA, however, is not prone to that level of manipulation.93 CBA
methodology, assumptions, and inputs generally have not varied
significantly across administrations.94 This Article, in fact, identifies
several CBA norms and argues that courts will review CBAs for
compliance with those norms, constraining some policy changes.
Admittedly, though, concerns about manipulation are high when
large categories of costs or benefits are not quantified. On one hand,
just because an impact cannot be quantified at the current time does
not mean that it is not a real, even important, impact. CBA-based
decisionmaking must allow an agency to consider such impacts. On the
other hand, large gaps in the estimation of costs or benefits could
provide a misleading picture of the overall effects—and generate
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486
(2001).
91. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental
Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1232–33 (2014).
92. Id.
93. See discussion supra Part I.B.
94. See Fraas & Morgenstern, supra note 86.
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significant room to act based on policy preferences. In fact, scholars
have found evidence consistent with the view that unquantified impacts
could be used to influence outcomes. In a review of major regulations
from 2010 to 2013, Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner find that
agencies failed to monetize the costs and benefits of regulations when
in most cases they could have monetized or partially monetized those
costs and benefits.95 They also conclude that these failures were
“almost certainly masking errors of overregulation and
underregulation.”96
But unquantified impacts occur when CBA is not strictly followed.
The alternative to CBA would leave all impacts unquantified and, a
fortiori, be more prone to manipulation. Nonetheless, even assuming
that unquantified effects within the context of CBA are prone to a
more concerning brand of manipulation, they still would not leave
CBA outcomes unconstrained. Courts limit reliance on unquantified
effects by proscribing such uses as an attempt at wielding a “trump
card.”97 This limit on the use of unquantified effects cabins their
influence even if those effects are justifiably thought to be substantial.98
This means that agencies generally cannot justify predetermined
outcomes by manipulating the “value” of unquantified effects to make
up any shortfall in the estimated effects.99
Increased CBA reliance, then, reduces opportunities for
manipulation as compared to likely alternative approaches, and it
promotes better policies by encouraging sound quantification
whenever possible. It opens the black box of agency decisionmaking,
increasing transparency and allowing for meaningful accountability
and judicial review. Even assuming that decisionmaking is actually
95. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (2016).
96. Id.
97. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991).
98. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner provide a framework to help agencies quantify
and monetize effects within CBA when data is incomplete. See Masur & Posner, supra note 95,
at 92–94. Richard L. Revesz argues for agencies to use breakeven analysis. See Revesz, supra note
49 at 1425. Robert W. Hahn argues that unquantified effects should carry zero weight so that
additional quantification is incentivized. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis
of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1037–38 (2004).
99. This limit is likely to result in underregulation because benefits are more likely to be
unquantified. And quantifying and monetizing benefits often leads to them having higher value
in the analysis than the implicit value when they were unquantified. For example, economic
estimates of the value of statistical lives are often much higher than the implicit values used when
lives remain unmonetized. See W. KIP VISCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER
SOCIETY 1–6 (2018).
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driven by some political or policy preferences, an explicit reliance on
CBA commits an agency to attempt to justify these preferences using
science and economics.100 This is because SEC v. Chenery Corp.
requires a reviewing court to uphold an agency’s action only on the
grounds upon which the agency relied when it acted.101 Therefore,
when an agency purports to rely on CBA, regardless of its true
underlying motivation, the agency’s action will be judged based on the
soundness of its CBA. And a sound CBA imposes constraints on the
available regulatory policies, allowing only those that are arguably
welfare enhancing. In other words, CBA procedure forces agency
officials to articulate and defend science-based rationales for their
proposed regulatory policy. Thus, the Chenery principle dovetails with
CBA to promote relevant transparency and accountability, even where
CBA cannot force agency officials to reveal their true motivations.102
Instead of obscuring decisionmaking behind science, CBA provides
the best chance for elevating agency decisionmaking above policy
preferences and making it about science.
2. Better Policies. CBA is a flexible constraint available to
agencies that, in some circumstances, promotes the staying power of
agency regulation.103 That is, CBA procedures give agencies the
opportunity to issue rules that are more likely to stick. Because of the
benefits of increased staying power that come from tying a policy to a
CBA, agencies are incentivized to maximize reliance on best-available
estimates of costs and benefits and to minimize reliance on
unquantified effects. And if data is currently incomplete or
unavailable, agencies are incentivized to promote the necessary
research.104 Although it is sometimes impossible to fully quantify and
100. In addition, as discussed in the next Part, there are real economic and judicial constraints
to policy changes grounded in CBA.
101. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).
102. See Stack, supra note 60, at 993–98 (discussing how the Chenery principle generally
promotes transparency and accountability, though not in the context of CBA).
103. In this account, CBA could be considered a tool that helps agencies maximize the staying
power of the regulations they issue. Typically, scholars characterize CBA as a constraint on
agency action within a principal-agency context, wherein CBA helps the president control agency
decisionmaking. See Kagan, supra note 18 at 2277; Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994). See generally Posner, supra note
18;
104. These predictions rely on continued access to and support for underlying scientific
research. Without ongoing research, regulations will be based on increasingly outdated studies.
However, research is diffused and funded by multiple sources, so it would be difficult for any one
group to eliminate it.
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monetize some effects, incentivizing quantification and monetization
to the extent possible is a good thing. Once these effects are monetized,
they establish a floor on the value in the analysis. As a result, regulatory
policy becomes more efficient.
Finally, the argument is not that CBA itself will lead to the best
policies. Rather, it is that reliance on CBA encourages better
consideration of impacts, which in turn leads to better policies. There
are things that CBA, by itself, simply cannot do. Important criticisms
include its failure to account for distributional impacts and other
fairness-based considerations. These considerations are outside the
scope of CBA. An agency could and should still deviate from a CBAbased policy for the sake of considerations of equity or dignity, but in
light of the CBA, the agency would have to transparently state and
defend its decision to do so.105 This, too, is desirable from the
perspective of accountability. It actually ensures that fairness- and
dignity-based decisions are not masked by the technical process of
agency rulemaking.
3. Real Retrospective Review. Virtually everyone agrees that it is
important to look back and evaluate how regulations are actually
working and to modify, update, or repeal them if they are not. In fact,
every president since Jimmy Carter has sought to identify and address
existing regulations that are inefficient through a process of
retrospective review of regulatory costs and benefits.106 More recently,
President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563 called on each agency to
“periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine
whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined,
expanded, or repealed so as to make the agency’s regulatory program
more effective or less burdensome in achieving the regulatory
objectives.”107 Even President Trump has embraced this idea to the
extent that his Executive Order 13,771 encourages agencies to look

105. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 61, at 18. For a discussion of how the executive branch can
deal effectively with the distributional consequences of regulation, see Richard L. Revesz,
Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489 (2018).
106. Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257, 1264–66 (2006).
107. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see also Exec. Order No.
13,579, 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012) (urging independent agencies to establish plans for periodic review);
Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 14, 2012) (setting policies aimed at reducing
“unjustified regulatory burdens”).
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closely at their existing stock of regulations to identify regulations to
repeal or adjust.108
It is difficult, however, to actually get agencies to look back at
existing regulations and evaluate their effectiveness. According to
Susan E. Dudley, past retrospective-review initiatives failed largely
because agencies have no incentives to look back at regulations that
they have already issued.109 She is optimistic that a regulatory-budget
concept, like the one in President Trump’s Executive Order 13,771,
might create those missing internal incentives.110 Although the Order’s
budget and offset requirements might indeed provide some pressure
for agencies to get rid of existing regulations, they are not likely to
provide the incentives needed to ensure that existing ineffective or netcostly rules are identified and repealed.111 The Order does not require
agencies to prioritize net-costly regulations for repeal, and there are
reasons to suspect that agencies would not prioritize such
regulations.112
An ongoing and judicially encouraged commitment to CBA,
however, could create the right incentives for real retrospective review
of regulations. If CBA functions as a gatekeeper for promulgating
significant regulatory changes, then an agency that wants to change a
prior policy—because, say, it believes that policy is not effective—has
to go out and find evidence for its belief. Its best bet is to investigate
the on-the-ground costs and benefits of the policy. By examining the
actual effects of regulatory policies, an agency could set the
groundwork for policy change and obtain useful information that could
make its predictions about effects more accurate going forward.113 And
that is exactly what real retrospective review is about.
Of course, CBA has been around, and gaining momentum, for
years. If CBA itself is enough, then why has retrospective review failed
to take off? Sporadic CBA, the results of which can be discarded or
108. Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017); see Cass Sunstein, Sludge and
Ordeals, 68 DUKE L.J 1843 (2019) (identifying categories of rules that are ripe for repeal).
109. Susan E. Dudley, Can Fiscal Budget Concepts Improve Regulation?, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 259, 267–68 (2016) (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 268.
111. Cecot & Livermore, supra note 48, at 9–10.
112. Id.
113. The “greatest virtue” of retrospective review is its potential to generate information that
could improve agency estimation and analysis going forward. Adam J. White, Retrospective
Review, for Tomorrow’s Sake, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/retrospective-review-for-tomorrows-sake
[https://perma.cc/TQ85BYNW]. See generally Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 76.
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ignored when expedient, is not enough. What is needed is a
commitment to the practice across administrations and an
understanding of CBA’s role in policy changes. The signposts for an
emerging commitment have been appearing in judicial opinions in the
last few years—most prominently in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Michigan v. EPA114 and in D.C. Circuit decisions promoting rigorous
CBA of financial regulations.115 The next Part describes the particular
role CBA plays in constraining policy changes.
II. CBA-BASED CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY CHANGES
CBA can constrain agency decisionmaking and, in particular,
changes in agency policy over time. Whenever a new administration
gains control of the White House, changes in regulatory priorities are
expected and often desirable. But administrative law—propelled by
the APA’s requirement that agency actions not be “arbitrary” or
“capricious”—has created a system of rules to ensure that any changes
in course are rational and predictable.116 These requirements ensure
that regulatory programs are not created and destroyed solely because
of changing political tides. One of these administrative law checks is
CBA, which serves as a powerful summary of the agency’s factual
findings on the costs and benefits of regulations. CBA ensures that
changes to policy are based on some evenhanded analysis of costs and
benefits.
If done well, a regulation’s original CBA can wield great influence.
First, judicial review of agency policy changes in the context of CBA
constrains swings in rulemaking. Courts already review all CBAs to
make sure they are transparent and sensible. Although courts are
generally deferential when first encountering an agency CBA, courts
have taken a closer look at agency changes that depart from existing
CBAs, requiring reasoned explanations for those changes. In
particular, courts require agencies to explain why a new CBA is
different from the old one. This makes it more difficult in some cases
for an agency to change policy to perfectly align with a new
114. Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court’s majority in Michigan v. EPA, declared
that “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good,” Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015), and Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, agreed that harms
of regulation must be considered, id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority—
let there be no doubt about this—that EPA’s power plant regulation would be unreasonable if
‘[t]he Agency gave cost no thought at all.’”).
115. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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administration’s priorities or preferences. Second, accepted CBA
procedure further constrains changes. The status quo for any proposed
changes now involves the old rule, and this regulatory baseline alters
the costs and benefits of moving to a new policy. Ultimately, CBA
reliance prevents huge welfare-reducing swings while allowing
reasonable and transparent policy- or science-based modifications.
A. Judicial Review
Judicial review of agency CBAs constrains swings in rulemaking.
In particular, the APA requires agencies to act rationally by explaining
their decisions, especially when changing course from prior policies or
regulations.117 When the prior policy relied on a CBA, a change from
that policy must confront the prior CBA—both its underlying facts and
its conclusions. This means that although courts are generally
deferential when first encountering an agency CBA, courts are likely
to closely scrutinize a new CBA to ensure that those explanations are
present.
1. A Soft Look on CBA. Courts have long reviewed the adequacy
of an agency’s CBA under appropriate challenges based on the APA.
When an agency permissibly relies on a CBA in its decisionmaking,
courts have been asked to review (1) whether the scope of the CBA is
appropriate in light of the agency’s statutory mandate, (2) whether the
agency preserved transparency by providing sufficient information in
its CBA for notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review, and
(3) whether the assumptions or methodology underlying the CBA were
sound.118 Generally speaking, courts have been deferential when
evaluating CBAs.119
A CBA’s scope refers to the categories of costs and benefits that
are considered, quantified, and monetized in the CBA. As discussed, a
CBA is most useful when it quantifies and monetizes all relevant direct
and indirect costs and benefits of each regulatory alternative. That way,
regulators can make decisions based on complete information,
minimizing the likelihood of unintended consequences. But deciding
which costs and benefits to consider and how thoroughly to quantify

117. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515
(2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
118. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23.
119. Id. at 590.
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and monetize each category often depends on the availability of
information and agency resources.
From the perspective of CBA, readily available impacts should be
included.120 The argument for omitting impacts is typically an argument
about statutory authority. Congress defines the agency’s task, and
Congress can limit the agency’s consideration of some impacts when
implementing the task. Courts generally defer to agency judgments on
questions of scope unless the agency ignores a factor that Congress
required it to consider121 or the agency does not treat costs and benefits
similarly.122 At least one court has sanctioned an agency’s broad
analysis of impacts when the statutory text did not restrict the agency’s
consideration of impacts.123 In fact, any time the overall statute is
committed to improving social welfare, courts should hesitate to
interpret it as restricting an agency’s ability to account for important
welfare changes. Courts have already encouraged this type of broad
analysis in the context of costs, recognizing the unreasonableness of
ignoring the indirect costs of regulatory intervention on net welfare.124
It remains to be seen, however, if courts will extend this reasoning to
indirect benefits and essentially require the agency to broadly consider
all reasonable direct and indirect impacts when the statute is silent on
the scope of analysis.125
In addition, courts have promoted transparency in CBA.126 As
discussed in the previous Part, one of the advantages of CBA in agency

120. See discussion infra Part II.B.
121. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 593–95.
122. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983).
123. See U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 625–26 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when
the statutory “text does not foreclose the Agency from considering co-benefits and doing so is
consistent with the [statute’s] purpose,” the agency may consider co-benefits). I would go further
and suggest that the agency should consider co-benefits unless that is clearly foreclosed by the
statute’s text or purpose.
124. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (explaining that the advantages
and disadvantages of regulation include not just direct compliance costs, but also indirect “harms
that regulation might do to human health or the environment”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,
947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that EPA must consider the indirect safety effects of
substitutes for car brakes when banning asbestos-based brakes under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (“TSCA”)).
125. It is difficult to argue that agencies should treat indirect benefits differently than indirect
costs. See Richard L. Revesz, Pruitt Would Like Us to Ignore the Indirect Benefits of
Environmental Regulations, SLATE (June 13, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://slate.com/
technology/2018/06/scott-pruitt-is-trying-to-undermine-environmental-regulation-in-acreative-way.html [https://perma.cc/65AJ-3H4J].
126. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 602–03.
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decisionmaking is its transparency. CBA limits the agency’s ability to
obscure the reasons for its judgments by requiring the agency to list,
quantify, and monetize its considerations. A well-conducted CBA will
reveal and explain all its components: assumptions, methodologies,
and underlying models and studies. In that way, stakeholders can
comment on these aspects of the CBA during the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, pointing out any errors or deficiencies or
challenging the agency’s explanations, while providing the agency with
an opportunity to correct its analysis. CBA transparency thus serves an
important role in the deliberative rulemaking process. Courts have
enforced transparency and disclosure obligations, even on seemingly
obscure details such as the specific methodology behind an agency’s
crash-risk analysis or the origin of statistics underlying a few
estimates.127
Courts generally do not weigh in on the substance of an agency’s
methodology, nor do they frequently second-guess agency
assumptions, choice of model, or other technical issues.128 In part, this
reluctance is due to a recognition that many of these decisions cannot
be made solely on the basis of science but rather, to some extent, reflect
underlying values and judgments. These are also the kinds of
challenges that are most often considered beyond the expertise of the
judicial branch. But even in these methodological challenges, courts
have sometimes undertaken a more thorough review when the relevant
statute appears to require one,129 demonstrating that they are capable
of doing so.
2. A Hard Look on Policy Changes. Historically, there are many
examples of agencies changing course, and courts have closely
evaluated those agencies’ policy changes. More than thirty years ago,
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”)
changed a prior policy, rescinding a passive-restraint requirement for
motor vehicles that it had previously promulgated.130 The resulting
litigation defined the contours of review under the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard.131 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the
127. Id.; see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. FMCSA, 494 F.3d 188, 199–202
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1419 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
128. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23, at 598–601.
129. Id.
130. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34 (1983).
131. Id. at 42–44.
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United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court scrutinized whether the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.132

The majority held that NHTSA had failed to adequately explain why
it had rescinded the passive-restraint requirement.133 Specifically, the
Court held that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is
obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
instance.”134 Further, the Court reasoned that “[i]f Congress
established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that
presumption . . . is not against safety regulation, but against changes in
current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record.”135
Although it speculated that “it may be easier for an agency to justify a
deregulatory action,” the Court emphasized that “the direction in
which an agency chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial
review established by law.”136
The Supreme Court again confronted judicial review in the
context of changing policy fifteen years later in Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.137 The
majority in Fox clarified that an agency is not subject to greater review
when it changes a policy than it was or would have been when it created
the initial policy in the first instance.138 But the agency must display
awareness that it is changing its position and provide “good reasons”
for the new policy.139 In particular, “a reasoned explanation is needed
for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
engendered by the prior policy” because “[i]t would be arbitrary or

132. Id. at 43.
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). The Court previously hinted
at these issues in other cases, such as INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996).
138. Fox, 556 U.S. at 514.
139. See id. at 515.
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capricious to ignore such matters.”140 In other words, it is not that the
judicial review of policy changes is more stringent; rather, the agency
may have to develop a more comprehensive record because it must
confront and explain the facts developed in the first record. According
to the Court, the matters that require attention and explanation include
the facts and evidence that the agency previously found controlling.141
It also suggested that the agency would have to consider the serious
reliance interests created by the initial policy.142
Most recently, in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,143 the
Supreme Court again cited Fox for the idea that “a reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that
underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”144 In fact, it stated
that a regulation that does not explain an inconsistency is arbitrary and
capricious, and an arbitrary and capricious regulation, in turn,
“receives no Chevron deference.”145 This language is striking; it
suggests that defects in agency decisionmaking reflected in CBA could
doom an agency’s regulation—even when the agency enjoys significant
discretion. As in previous cases, the Court in Encino Motorcars was
concerned about the “reliance interests” at stake, and the agency was
thus required to give more than a “conclusory” explanation of the
policy change.146
Taken together, these cases roughly outline how judicial review
reinforces CBA-based regulatory stability. When an agency relies on
CBA in developing its policy, it relies on a summary of facts about the
likely impact of the policy. When an agency wants to change course
pursuant to a new CBA, it relies on a new summary of facts. That new
CBA would have to explain the key differences and confront the fact
that significant investments might have been incurred in reliance on
the prior policy. This transforms the judicial review from a soft look
that assesses technical inputs to a hard look that ensures that the
agency provides reasoned explanations for any deviations. Judicial
review of agency rationales has bite; inadequate explanation is one of

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
Id. at 2120 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–516).
Id.
Id.
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the most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.147 Kevin
M. Stack explains how in State Farm, the agency’s initial reasons acted
as a commitment device as well as “a basis for evaluating its own future
actions implicating those grounds.”148 In the same way, by relying on
CBA initially, an agency commits itself to a technical welfare-based
rationale and ties its future self to at least explaining any deviations
from that sort of reasoning.149 If the new policy improves on the old one
in terms of welfare, as summarized in a well-reasoned and updated
CBA, then judicial review has nothing to say. But if the new policy is
not an improvement on those original terms, courts will require the
agency to explain why.
Admittedly, courts are not experts in what makes for a wellreasoned CBA. In this regard, too, a court’s task is simplified when an
agency changes a CBA-based policy in light of a new CBA. The record
before the court includes the prior CBA and the new CBA. The prior
CBA essentially announces to courts: here are the facts and evidence
that the agency previously found persuasive and controlling. It thereby
focuses judicial review, highlighting which seemingly technical inputs
in underlying risk assessments might be ultimately important in driving
the agency’s policy. Further, by monetizing the benefits to the prior
policy’s beneficiaries, the prior CBA identifies and underscores the
reliance interests at stake.
B. CBA-Updating Rules
An agency must follow certain “rules” to update regulations in a
reasonable, CBA-justified way. These rules are based on economic and
accounting principles that support the practice of CBA, and they are
described in guidelines on CBA from the Office of Management and

147. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1035 tbl.6 (1990) (showing that about
20 percent of remands in 1985 were based on an inadequate agency rationale); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN.
L. REV. 61, 72 (1997) (suggesting that inadequate agency reasoning is the most frequent ground
for judicial rejection of agency decisions).
148. Stack, supra note 60, at 997–98 (concluding that the reason-giving practice promoted by
the Chenery doctrine “promotes conditions for rationality, regularity, stability, and principled
accountability within the boundaries of acceptable discretion”).
149. See Buzbee, supra note 26, at 1401 (describing more generally how courts have
“require[d] substantial engagement” with “contingencies” created by underlying facts and
circumstances).
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Budget or from agencies themselves.150 Most important for CBAupdating purposes, the agency must include all relevant impacts,
calculate costs and benefits relative to the appropriate baseline, and
estimate impacts based on the best evidence available.151 The
application of these rules is particularly important in the context of
deregulation, where decisions on the baseline, input estimates, and
scope carry significant weight.
Under a welfare economics framework, a CBA should contain all
effects of the proposed policy on social welfare. This ensures that
regulators base their risk-management decisions on an accurate picture
of the actual effects of regulatory action. In practice, however, it is
impossible to estimate all effects. How many effects should the agency
analyze in its CBA? When deciding where to draw the line, the
economics perspective suggests that an agency should consider an
effect as long as the value of the information to the decision exceeds
the costs of obtaining the information. Even then, it is difficult to figure
out which costs and benefits are important and to assess the costs and
benefits of additional information ex ante. Agencies must also allocate
limited resources to multiple rulemakings, which might explain the
deference courts have given agencies on issues of CBA scope.152
When a prior CBA exists in the administrative record, there is a
reference point on the achievable scope of CBA. Any changes to the
scope of benefits or costs in an updated CBA would require some
explanation. If the scope expands to include additional effects in light
of new scientific evidence of causal connections and harm, then the
new CBA, by all accounts, is improved and provides a clearer picture
of the actual impacts on social welfare. But it is difficult to find any
economically grounded reason for reducing the scope of CBA,
especially when there is readily available information on relevant
impacts. In the deregulatory context, any new CBA should include all
categories of benefits that were previously considered important and
on which information has already been obtained.
In addition, once issued and implemented, a policy becomes part
of the baseline, or the status quo. Any modification of that policy
requires a CBA that calculates costs and benefits from the baseline of
that existing policy. In that way, a deregulatory CBA is not the inverse

150. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, OMB Circular A-4,
Regulatory Analysis (2003); EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2014).
151. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 150, at 26; EPA, supra note 150, at 11-2.
152. Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23.
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of the prior CBA, unless the prior policy was issued recently and never
implemented. In the context of deregulatory actions that rescind rules
that have already been implemented, the new CBA has to compare the
benefits of cost savings—that is, of reducing stringency or eliminating a
technology-based requirement—against the costs of foregone
benefits—reductions in air quality or other prior health- and welfarerelated benefits of the prior, implemented policy.
Even assuming that some regulations were not CBA justified
when issued, the costs and benefits of continuing an existing,
implemented regulation are different than those of implementing a
new regulation. On the cost side, firms may have already made
expensive capital investments in pollution-control technology, and any
changes to the rule might impose additional costs on the firms. This
dynamic was recently highlighted when a letter from the electric-power
industry urged EPA to keep the mercury and air toxics standards
(“MATS”) in place.153 The industry had been fighting the MATS rule
since it was issued, but at this point, it has spent more than $18 billion
to comply with it.154 Now, “[g]iven the scale of investment, the industry
groups said that regulatory certainty is ‘critical.’”155 Given that onetime
investments have already been made, the benefits of rescinding the
MATS rule would be very small. It would be difficult for the Trump
administration to justify repealing the rule, even if EPA reevaluates
the foregone benefits to society as being much smaller than the
forecasted benefits of the MATS rule when it was originally
implemented.156 Alternatively, the use of the MATS pollution-control
technology might have become the market standard—or, perhaps,
required by states—and adjusting to alternative, even if cheaper,
technology might require significant adjustment costs.157 In all these
153. See Utility Industry Urges EPA to Keep Mercury Emissions Rule in Place and Speed
Reviews, ENERGIZE WEEKLY (July 18, 2018), https://www.euci.com/utility-industry-urges-epa-tokeep-mercury-emissions-rule-in-place-and-speed-reviews/ [https://perma.cc/G9GY-DCEQ]
[hereinafter Utility Industry Urges EPA]; see also Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, The EPA’s
Review of Mercury Rules Could Remake Its Methods for Valuing Human Life and Health, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/climate/epa-mercury-life-costbenefit.html [https://perma.cc/6BTK-XDHF].
154. Utility Industry Urges EPA, supra note 153.
155. Id.
156. See Davenport & Friedman, supra note 153 (discussing how the Trump administration
might exclude consideration of important categories of benefits of the MATS rule).
157. In ongoing research, Kerry Krutilla has tried to estimate the magnitude of cost savings
and benefit losses from repealing technology rules, behavioral rules, and certification rules from
DOT and EPA. Kerry Krutilla, Presentation at Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis 10th Annual
Conference & Meeting: A Taxonomy for Improved Regulatory Evaluations (Mar. 16, 2018)
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cases, the benefits of reducing stringency—the cost savings from lifting
the regulatory requirements—might approach zero.
This feature of CBA could be understood as a form of path
dependence—and it is why CBA has been characterized “as a tool for
defending the status quo.”158 By taking into account adjustment costs,
CBA incorporates these realistic considerations that weigh against
changing course—whether the change is the proposed implementation
of the policy in the first instance or, once implemented, the proposed
repeal of that policy. In particular, this effect makes it difficult to justify
deregulatory actions unless the prior policy required high ongoing
compliance costs; otherwise, the benefits of repealing the policy would
be low, while the costs—adjustment or other costs—could be high. In
this way, some forms of regulatory action are stickier than others from
a CBA perspective. And overall, the existence of sunk costs and
adjustment costs suggest that it might be more difficult to move away
from some old, long-accepted regulatory requirements.
Finally,
rational
rulemaking through CBA
requires
comprehensive, valid, and reliable measures of costs and benefits of
alternative policies. These input values are largely based on the
available scientific and economic evidence. A new administration
might understand and characterize such evidence differently, but it
cannot ignore the scientific evidence previously relied on, nor can it use
scientific evidence that does not yet exist, and this constrains the moves
it could make from the old rule. This constraint cuts in the opposite
direction as the previous constraint; it suggests that it would be difficult
to justify a new policy shortly after the prior policy was implemented
because the scientific evidence supporting the prior policy is unlikely
to have changed.
This feature of CBA provides some protection against regulatory
whiplash. But it does not have much constraining power when the
deviation is from an old prior policy, where the intervening years likely
produced new facts and realities. In those cases, the prior CBA might
look quite obsolete, even if it was pathbreaking for its time. For

(presentation materials on file with the Duke Law Journal). He has identified four critical
characteristics that drive the level of costs and benefits from deregulatory actions: capital
intensity, degree of voluntary market adoption, the scope of the regulation, and the nature of the
health and safety risk. His initial findings reveal that current deregulatory CBAs often fail to
consider these important characteristics, in some cases overstating the cost savings from
deregulation.
158. LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS
FOR POLICY 24–25 (Brookings Institution 1981).
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example, CBA led the Reagan administration to adopt a much stricter
standard for phasing out leaded gasoline than either it or the previous
administration initially thought warranted.159 If EPA were to revisit
that decision, a modern CBA would likely have justified an even faster
phasedown; more recent studies suggest that the benefits of phasing
out lead in gasoline were substantially higher than initially estimated.160
In this way, regulatory policy evolves over time as scientific
understanding of the underlying regulatory problem advances.
III. DEREGULATORY CBA UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
As discussed in the previous parts, CBA increasingly informs
agency decisionmaking. In this CBA world, policy changes are more
difficult. Although CBA does accommodate changing facts and values,
there are constraints on valid updates to a CBA. As the prior policy
becomes the new status quo, the benefits of moving away from it often
become smaller, especially in the case of deregulatory actions after
investments have already been made. In addition, Supreme Court
precedent suggests that when evaluating the agency reasoning that
underlies policy changes, the agency must provide a reasonable
explanation for deviating from the prior policy. When the prior policy
was supported by CBA, the agency has to confront the prior CBA and
explain any deviations from that CBA’s assumptions and
methodology. Courts have also required that agencies treat costs and
benefits equally, again demanding a reasoned explanation for any
differential treatment. Taken together, these principles constrain
agency policy changes. The degree of constraint depends on three
factors: (1) the statutory mandate to conduct and consider CBA,
(2) the quality and completeness of the prior CBA, and (3) the agency’s
reliance on the prior CBA.
A. Degree of Constraint
Generally speaking, when a court confronts a prior CBA in the
record, it requires the agency to explain any deviations from that CBA,

159. See Statement of Christopher DeMuth, supra note 40.
160. See, e.g., Joel Schwartz, Societal Benefits of Reducing Lead Exposure, 66 ENVTL.
RESEARCH 105, 119 (1994) (estimating net benefits of $17.2 billion per year for each microgram
of reduction in average blood-lead concentrations); Debra J. Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in
the US Population, 272 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 277, 281 (1994) (estimating a ten-microgram
decline in average blood-lead levels in children due in large part to the lead phasedown).
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unless the agency is prohibited from relying on CBA.161 Sometimes the
record includes a prior CBA that the agency could have but did not rely
on. This might happen when an agency conducts CBA pursuant to
executive order but disavows any reliance on it in determining
regulatory stringency—even when the CBA would support its action.
An agency might purposefully do this in order not to commit itself to
CBA-based policy explanations and development—that is, to preserve
its power to act without reliance on CBA. For example, when EPA set
out to regulate hazardous air-pollutant emissions from power plants, it
was required to first determine whether such regulation would be
“appropriate and necessary.”162 As part of its decisionmaking, EPA
conducted a CBA showing that the net benefits of regulating
hazardous air pollutants would be up to $80 billion, especially when
taking into account the particulate matter that would also be reduced
under the regulation.163 Nonetheless, the agency refused to rely on this
CBA to support its determination either in the rulemaking or in the
subsequent litigation.164 Instead, the agency’s preferred justification for
the rule relied on a less formal and more qualitative analysis that did
not explicitly refer to costs, presumably in an effort to retain authority
to set more stringent standards later.165
In these cases, the power of the prior CBA to constrain future
policy deviations is low. But even then, the CBA might be relevant if it
supports the prior policy and is persuasive; it could call into question
the agency’s reasoning for changing course, notwithstanding the
agency’s disavowal of the analysis.166 For example, in R.J. Reynolds

161. Sometimes an agency’s statutory mandate does not allow it to consider costs or, by
extension, a CBA. For example, the Clean Air Act prohibits EPA from relying on costs when
setting national air-quality standards for criteria pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012);
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In that case, the CBA—whether prior or
new—is legally irrelevant to the agency’s decision, which must be based on the statutorily
permissible factors. Of course, this situation may present other limits on deregulatory actions. In
particular, such statutory mandates prohibit CBA by prohibiting the consideration of costs.
Where that is the case, deregulation motivated by cost considerations such as cost savings for the
industry may be impermissible as well.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).
163. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL MERCURY AND AIR
TOXICS STANDARDS AT ES-1 TO ES-2 (2011).
164. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711 (2015).
165. The Supreme Court, in considering the Clean Air Act, ultimately held that section
112(n)(1)(A)’s “broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors,”
which “include but are not limited to cost.” Id. at 2709.
166. More broadly, the prior CBA could highlight important factual issues that the agency
would need to address under State Farm when it changes course.
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Tobacco Co. v. FDA,167 the D.C. Circuit held that the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) did not provide substantial evidence
that graphic warnings on cigarette advertising would directly advance
its interest in reducing smoking rates to a material degree.168 Although
the case was about limits on commercial speech,169 it is relevant here
because the court used the agency’s own CBA against it; the CBA
essentially conceded that graphic warnings would not directly advance
the asserted government interest to a material degree.170 This case
suggests that a prior CBA, if persuasive enough, could still have some
constraining influence on agency policy even when the agency
promulgating the initial rule did not rely on it. Any move to change
such a policy should therefore confront that prior CBA.
But it is when these three features coincide—statutory authority
to rely on CBA; actual agency reliance; and high-quality or, at least,
complete CBA—that the prior CBA has maximum constraining
power. In such cases, an agency must not only acknowledge the CBA
justification of its prior policy but also explain why it is departing from
that justification. If the agency throws out a CBA-justified policy for
no articulated reason, the agency’s decision is vulnerable to attack as
arbitrary and capricious under the APA and, likely, under the relevant
statute.171 When the prior CBA is incomplete, the agency can more
easily make out good CBA-based reasons for changing course. For
one, it could simply complete the CBA without having to justify its
science- or policy-based choices against those in the prior CBA. If the
prior CBA, for example, relied on qualitative assessment of benefits
because reliable studies were not available, then the agency should be
able to quantify and monetize these estimates once such studies
become available. Similarly, when the prior CBA is low quality—
making questionable assumptions or relying on outdated methodology
or inputs—the agency does, and should, have an easier time explaining
deviations from those decisions in its new CBA.
167. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
168. Id.
169. In 2014, the D.C. Circuit overruled the part of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. decision
that limited application of rational basis review to narrow circumstances. Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d
at 22–23. This perceived limitation on the application of rational basis review led the panel to
apply a more exacting standard—intermediate scrutiny.
170. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1219–21.
171. An agency might put forth a non-CBA-based reason for such a departure. For example,
the agency may argue that it no longer believes that it has authority to regulate. Part V.D.1
discusses this kind of slippage.
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Thus, relying on a high-quality CBA to support its policy is one
way an agency can protect against future unwarranted abandonment
of the policy. If the agency reassesses the CBA, it will have to explain
any differences it makes to the prior CBA. Under the economics
framework and in light of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on reliance
interests, the agency will have to acknowledge the different costs and
benefits of moving from the old policy to the new one. The new CBA
would have to support this change. Although courts review the
agency’s initial decisions on scope and methodology deferentially,
courts will likely require reasoned explanations for any changes to
scope and methodology in order to determine whether such changes
were arbitrary or capricious.
As discussed in the previous Part, providing a good reason for
changing course is not as easy as it sounds. Courts have been strict in
requiring reasoned explanations—even in the context of science-based
or otherwise technical considerations. Recently, the D.C. Circuit
rejected EPA’s decision to loosen a prior rule’s stringency in regulating
carbon monoxide (“CO”) under some circumstances; the deregulatory
move, according to the court, was arbitrary and capricious.172 The court
explained that “EPA was operating against the backdrop of its own
prior reasoned judgment that ‘minimizing CO emissions will result in
minimizing non-dioxin organic [hazardous air pollutants],’” and that
the agency’s “conclusion appears to be counter to the only empirical
evidence EPA had before it.”173
Requiring a reasoned explanation might be especially
constraining when an agency attempts to alter the scope of a CBA.
When reviewing the adequacy of a CBA, courts have demanded equal
treatment of costs and benefits. A prior CBA provides a reference
point for the achievable scope of a CBA. Any changes to the scope of
costs or benefits could raise issues of unequal treatment, promote
unbalanced analysis, or raise the risk of unintended consequences. For
example, one district court has pointed to a prior Environmental
172. Sierra Club v. EPA, 884 F.3d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
173. Id. at 1198. In another example, EPA promulgated a maximum-contaminant-level goal
of zero chloroform in drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act, see Final Rule: National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts, 63 Fed. Reg.
69,390, 69,398/3 (Dec. 16, 1998), despite earlier concluding that chloroform exhibits a “nonlinear
mode of carcinogenic action,” with exposures below some level posing no risk of cancer, National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection Byproducts Notice of Data
Availability, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,674, 15,686/1 (Mar. 31, 1998). The D.C. Circuit agreed with industry
petitioners that EPA could not backtrack from its previous conclusion without sufficient
explanation.
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Impact Statement (“EIS”)—an analysis focused on environmental
impacts that is otherwise similar to CBA—to cast doubt on the Bureau
of Land Management’s reasons for quantifying the benefits but not the
costs of a coal-lease modification in a new EIS.174 Already, the Trump
administration has suggested that it might seek to limit the
consideration of indirect benefits in its regulatory and deregulatory
CBAs.175 If such changes to the treatment of benefits are not tied
closely to the statutory language, then they will be suspect, especially
if the scope of indirect costs is not similarly constrained.
B. Constraints in Action
How will these CBA-based constraints apply to the Trump
administration’s deregulatory agenda? In several stays of rules pending
reconsideration, the Trump administration has ignored the costs and
benefits of the original rules. For example, DOI justified its decision to
stay the implementation of the Waste Prevention Rule by pointing to
“substantial time and resources to comply with regulatory
requirements” that would be wasted if industries were forced to
comply with the rule before the agency decided whether it would
change course.176 But the DOI made no similar effort to consider the
foregone benefits to society from the agency’s decision to stay the rule.
Depending on the length of the stay, the foregone benefits could be
substantial, as the rule was originally estimated to generate $127
million in annual net benefits to society.177
Such one-sided consideration of costs to support repeals or
modifications of regulations would likely be deemed arbitrary and
capricious. Although questions of CBA scope or depth are sometimes
difficult for courts to evaluate, an agency decision based on an analysis
that ignores benefits completely is easily seen as irrational. As
discussed previously, courts look to statutes to define the appropriate

174. High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1184,
1189 (D. Colo. 2014).
175. Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the
Rulemaking Process, 83 Fed. Reg. 27524 (proposed June 13, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R ch.
I).
176. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27430 (June 15, 2017) (to be codified
at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3170).
177. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed.
Reg. 83008 (Nov. 18, 2016) (43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 3170).
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scope of CBA.178 Though the statute might limit or expand the
categories of costs or benefits that could be considered, almost every
energy and environmental statute has a goal of achieving some benefit
and tasks the agency with achieving that benefit under specific
circumstances. Taking agency action without addressing these
statutory benefits at all would miss an important aspect of the problem.
Even assuming that a statute is ambiguous as to the consideration of
benefits, these actions would rely on quantitative analysis of impacts
without treating costs the same way as benefits. In fact, they would
ignore benefits completely, defying “[s]imple logic, fairness, and the
premises of cost-benefit analysis.”179 Simply put, when an agency relied
on a prior CBA to justify its rulemaking, it cannot change course
without acknowledging the foregone benefits and considering them
equally with the cost savings from repealing or modifying the rule.
Of course, the Trump administration has only pursued this
strategy in stays of Obama-era rules.180 It is unlikely that the
administration would do so when actually proposing to repeal or
modify a rule, and it has not done so to date. In proposed repeals, the
Trump administration agencies have signaled that they might
deemphasize certain categories of benefits by leaving them
unquantified or unmonetized; expand the categories of monetized
costs; and recalculate CBAs, modifying the estimates of costs or
benefits to support their new policies. For example, when the Trump
EPA proposed the repeal of the so-called Waters of the United States
Rule, the accompanying CBA left unquantified several categories of
benefits that the Obama EPA had previously calculated.181 In

178. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
179. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983).
180. An agency’s omission could already be problematic at this stage, as the stays themselves
are challenged and the reasons underlying the stays are litigated. See, e.g., Clean Air Council v.
Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (invalidating the stay, but not on CBA grounds); Becerra v.
DOI, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2017). Even stays of regulations have costs (the foregone
benefits of the regulation during the duration of the stay) and benefits (the delayed incidence of
compliance and other costs). It makes sense for an agency to consider such costs and benefits
before deciding to freeze the implementation of final regulations. But interestingly, my account
of CBA-based constraints increases the importance of issuing stays in the early days of a new
administration. If regulations are not stayed, then costly investments are more likely to have been
incurred in reliance on the prior regulations. In such cases, it is more difficult to justify changing
course.
181. Compare EPA, Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United
States” – Recodification of Pre-existing Rules 8–11 (2017) [hereinafter EPA, CBA for the
WOTUS Repeal] (describing deviations from the prior analysis), with EPA, Economic Analysis
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particular, although the Trump EPA admitted that the prior rule
extended protection to more wetlands, it refused to provide an
estimate of the value of the foregone benefits of removing this
protection, determining that the prior CBA’s estimates relied on
studies that were too old to provide meaningful guidance as to the
value of protecting such wetlands.182 The original CBA supporting the
Waters of the United States Rule had quantified and monetized these
benefits, providing default benefit estimates that Trump’s EPA could
have used in its new analyses. Alternatively, agencies might seek to
remove previously considered categories of benefits or to include
previously unconsidered categories of costs. Newly omitted benefits
could include the indirect benefits of regulations, the consideration of
which has been opposed by regulated entities. Newly expanded
categories of costs might include the impacts of regulations on jobs.
By removing these categories of previously calculated benefits or
by adding categories of costs that were previously not considered, an
agency would improve the optics of the new CBAs underlying its
deregulatory actions. But even these decisions on details of CBA scope
and on the reliability of studies underlying CBA estimates—decisions
that are generally granted substantial deference by courts—may be
vulnerable, depending on the agency’s rationale for them. The prior
CBA provides a powerful default for the appropriate scope and
assumptions, and any deviations from this default would have to be
explained. In the proposed repeal of the Waters of the United States
Rule, EPA did provide an explanation for its choices, one that courts
are likely to scrutinize. In particular, it argued that the studies used to
value wetland preservation were too old and could not be relied upon
due to subsequent improvements in statistical and economic methods
and possible changes in public attitudes toward nature protection.183
Although courts are less likely to pass judgment on technical issues of
scope, underlying methodology, and assumptions, there is evidence
that EPA was inconsistent in its treatment of costs and benefits; studies
used to support the cost estimates were as old or older than the studies
originally used to support the benefits.184 The repeal is thus vulnerable
of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule 44–52 (2015) (discussing, for example, the value of
protecting wetlands as a result of the original WOTUS rule).
182. EPA, CBA for the WOTUS Repeal, supra note 181, at 8–9.
183. Id.
184. For a detailed description of inconsistencies in EPA’s treatment of costs and benefits,
see Jason Schwartz & Jeffrey Shrader, Muddying the Waters: How the Trump Administration is
Obscuring the Value of Wetlands Protection from the Clean Water Rule, INST. FOR POL’Y
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to challenge, given the potential inconsistency in its explanation for
departing from the prior CBA.
Similarly, agencies might remove previously considered categories
of benefits such as the indirect benefits of regulation. For example, to
support the repeal of the CPP, the new CBA included calculations that
ignored all the indirect benefits—sometimes called “co-benefits”—of
reducing carbon emissions from power plants. Courts have held that
the consideration of indirect costs is often necessary to reasoned
decisionmaking unless precluded by statute.185 This is no less true for
indirect benefits,186 though courts have yet to explicitly adopt this
reasoning. Thus, many of these arguments will center on whether
underlying statutes preclude consideration of indirect benefits.187 It
seems reasonable that unless the statute clearly and explicitly precludes
the consideration of indirect benefits, such benefits (just as with
indirect costs) must be considered; such a requirement seems especially
fitting in cases where resource concerns are not implicated because the
agency has already calculated these benefits.188
When the original CBA fails to quantify or monetize some
category of benefits or costs, the agency has more leeway to change its
qualitative judgment of those impacts. In such cases, a new judgment
that the unquantified benefits do not justify costs, for example, is much
more difficult to challenge on judicial review. In its proposed rescission
of the Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands Rule, DOI
failed to quantify and monetize any benefits,189 focusing only on cost
savings. There, the original rule also failed to quantify and monetize

INTEGRITY REP. (2017). EPA has proposed a revised rule defining “Waters of the United States.”
See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4,154 (Feb. 14, 2019).
185. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (explaining that the advantages and
disadvantages of regulation include not just direct compliance costs, but indirect “harms that
regulation might do to human health or the environment”); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947
F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that EPA must consider the indirect safety effects of
substitutes for car brakes when banning asbestos-based brakes under the TSCA).
186. See Revesz, supra note 124; see also Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 888 (2010).
187. So far, the D.C. Circuit has concluded that the consideration of indirect benefits is
permissible when not expressly precluded by statute. See U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579,
625–26 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
188. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(limiting an agency’s consideration of an otherwise important factor only when the agency “has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider”); see also discussion infra Part
V.D.1.
189. See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands; Rescission of a 2015
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 34,464 (July 25, 2017) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
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benefits.190 Because the benefits had not been quantified, the initial
judgment to proceed with the regulation was based on the agency’s
judgment of the value of the rule’s requirements. Even if there has
been no change in the underlying evidence, it is easier to explain an
agency’s reversal when the original analysis was qualitative and
essentially relied on value judgments.
Finally, the Trump administration might also encourage agencies
to conduct new CBAs that recalculate the costs and benefits of
regulations, subject to different valuations, assumptions, or
methodologies. For example, in March 2017, President Trump signed
Executive Order 13,783, withdrawing the technical documents
prepared by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of
Greenhouse Gases.191 This Order leaves agencies without specific
guidance on incorporating the social cost of greenhouse gases. This
move signaled that the administration might encourage use of a
different value for the environmental benefits of reducing greenhouse
gases. Agencies could use different discount rates, underlying models,
assumptions, and time horizons to recalculate costs and benefits. These
changes could be based on policy preferences, new studies, or new
information about the actual costs and benefits of implemented rules.
As long as agencies explain departures from the prior CBAs and treat
costs and benefits equally, courts are likely to uphold such
reassessments. That said, the explanations for departures must still be
reasoned explanations. It remains to be seen how much bite this
limitation will have in this context. Overall, the Trump administration
might be more successful in these cases, where the change in regulatory
policy confronts the prior CBA and provides an alternative but
reasonable view on the value of costs and benefits. Such a result would
recognize that agencies should be able to pursue different policy
considerations that are supported by the underlying evidence or to
change their assessments of costs and benefits over time as new
evidence emerges. Ultimately, CBA-updating norms and judicial
review provide basic constraints to ensure that reassessments still
support rational agency decisionmaking.

190. See Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128
(Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
191. See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783
§ 5(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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IV. DEFENSE OF CBA-BASED REGULATORY STABILITY
As discussed, several forces—the prevalence of CBA-based
agency decisionmaking, the hurdles inherent to CBA updating, and the
nature of judicial review of policy changes—combine to generate a role
for CBA in stabilizing regulatory policy. Whenever a new
administration gains control of the White House, changes in regulatory
priorities are expected and often desirable. But administrative law has
created a system of rules in order to ensure that any changes in course
are rational. CBA—once thought of simply as a tool of presidential
control—fits into the administrative law landscape as a commitment
device, constraining the terms of future policy changes. Its substantive
component confines presidential control through methodological
norms and judicial review. Regulations that are grounded in analysis—
even if that analysis invariably combines science with policy
considerations—will be more difficult to change, hindering the
agency’s ability to change policy to perfectly align with new priorities
or preferences. This Part responds to several challenges to the overall
desirability of allowing CBA to play such a role in stabilizing regulatory
policy.
A. Proregulatory Bias
Some critics of agency rulemaking argue that agencies have a bias
toward issuing regulation or value the benefits of regulation more
highly than society in general.192 If this is true, then this Article’s
account of CBA-based constraints on changes could exacerbate this
proregulatory bias when it limits deregulatory changes. In other words,
if (1) agencies overregulate, then (2) CBA-based constraints that limit
deregulation could further entrench overregulation.
First, there is no clear evidence that agencies have a bias toward
overregulation or, if they do, that current CBA-based constraints do
not help to counteract it. Many of the perceived mechanisms for such
a bias could instead work in the opposite direction.193 Further, it is clear

192. See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (1986) (lamenting that regulation “tends to be
excessively cautious (forcing investments in risk reduction far in excess of the value that
individuals place on avoiding the risks involved)”); Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE
L.J. 336, 369–70 (2014) (explaining why CBA would not correct this type of bias).
193. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1282–1304 (2006) (critically evaluating various theories of agencies’
tendencies to overregulate); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
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that in some cases agencies might need significant prodding to act. And
there is some evidence that CBA constrains potential overregulation.
As one extreme example, consider the aftermath of Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA.194 In that case, the Fifth Circuit ripped apart the CBA
underlying EPA’s decision to ban asbestos-based brakes under the
Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”).195 The case sent the message
that if EPA were to restrict a chemical again under TSCA, it would
have to support that decision with a well-supported CBA. This
requirement appeared to constrain EPA so much that it stopped using
TSCA altogether to restrict chemicals. In 2016, in response to EPA’s
inaction, Congress passed the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety
for the 21st Century Act, amending several key provisions of the
TSCA. Time will tell whether this effort will successfully prod EPA
into action. This tale demonstrates, however, that CBA requirements
could counteract some agency overregulation—at least by ensuring
that the agency does not issue net costly regulations.
Nonetheless, an agency might value the benefits of regulation
more highly than society. In such a case, Yair Listokin argues that CBA
will help the agency choose the right regulations but the agency will
still regulate too much.196 Theoretically, OIRA could monitor the
agency’s estimates to help correct for this kind of bias. And, to some
extent, OIRA does this oversight work. But OIRA is limited in staff
and time and, moreover, might be subject to the same kind of bias.
Alternatively, courts could monitor agency CBA for this bias. But here,
too, courts are unlikely to adequately correct for it. It is not evident
that judges could identify society’s true valuation of benefits, and in
any event, judicial review of CBA is rarely as exhaustive as the Fifth
Circuit’s review in Corrosion Proof Fittings. In practice, barring clear
errors, courts are likely to be deferential. To the extent that this kind
of overvaluation bias exists, agency CBA would not adequately
counteract it.197
Any bias, however, could be mitigated by undervaluation bias by
another administration. In other words, imagine that one
administration regulates too much and another one regulates too little
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1352 (2013) (“[F]or each claim there is a
‘counter-cannon’ that weighs in the opposite direction.”).
194. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
195. Id. at 1225.
196. Listokin, supra note 192, at 370.
197. Listokin argues that a regulatory budget, like the one that currently exists, could help
counteract this type of bias. See id.
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for society’s taste. But all administrations choose CBA-justified
regulations from the range of possible regulatory actions. Further,
CBA forces each to make all of the underlying valuations transparent
so that society can elect administrations that employ its preferred
valuations. CBA would still serve a valuable constraining, stabilizing,
and informational function.
Nonetheless, under my account, there would remain a
proregulatory asymmetry. The asymmetry does not come from CBA
norms—CBA is symmetrical whether evaluating regulatory or
deregulatory actions—but instead comes from my description of
judicial review. This Article argues that courts are more deferential to
the first CBA than the next CBA, which can be compared against the
first. This judicial review asymmetry arguably works against
deregulation because a deregulatory action is almost always a change
from a prior regulatory status quo.
As an initial matter, this asymmetry does not necessarily mean
that deregulatory actions are more constrained than regulatory actions;
rather, it provides a sort of first-mover CBA advantage. A later, more
stringent regulation supported by CBA would face the same
heightened judicial review constraints. And if the deregulatory action
is the first action supported by CBA, then courts would review that
CBA deferentially, and later proregulatory moves might be more
constrained.198 It is also possible that a “deregulatory” agency could
proactively regulate in statutorily prescribed contexts in ways
supported by CBAs that employ its value judgments on costs and
benefits, where such judgments are appropriate and applicable. In
other words, after the first CBA, all other moves—regulatory and
deregulatory—are subject to symmetrical judicial review. This greatly
narrows the circumstances in which this asymmetry systematically
hurts deregulatory policy.
It is also worth noting that judicial review of CBA might develop
over time such that courts become equally competent in analyzing
CBA with or without any prior CBA in the record. Even now, whether
reviewing the first CBA on the issue or the latest iteration, judicial
review is never fully deferential or fully critical.199 Yehonatan Givati
and Matthew C. Stephenson present a model that describes how an
intermediate level of judicial review generally drives agencies to adopt
198. The prior deregulatory CBA could become part of the record in several ways, most
prominently if interested parties bring it up and it becomes part of the agency’s record.
199. See Cecot & Viscusi, supra note 23.
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moderate policies.200 If review were fully deferential or fully critical,
each administration would impose its preferred policy. Any agency
bias during proregulatory administrations would be fully reflected in
policies, and the inevitable swings would create instability that would
almost certainly reduce welfare. By imposing analytical constraints and
triggering an intermediate level of judicial review, CBA could have its
most dramatic consequences in constraining biased—proregulatory
and deregulatory—agencies, as compared to any alternative
decisionmaking framework. Such agencies would adopt their most
preferred option among reasonable CBA-justified options. These
policies would be moderated both by the fear of intermediate judicial
review and by CBA norms. In return, policies supported by CBA
would enjoy staying power. Overall, policies would tend to be more
efficient for society than in a world without CBA.
B. Suboptimal Ossification
A related challenge is based on the ossification literature. One of
the justifications for agency—as opposed to congressional—action is
promoting flexibility. CBA-based constraints could limit an agency’s
ability to react to new facts and values. I call this phenomenon
regulatory stabilization, but others have referred to it as ossification.
Undoubtedly, there are costs and benefits to reducing an agency’s
ability to make unconstrained policy changes. This Article highlights
the benefits of making these constraints via a commitment to CBA.
CBA-based constraints introduce a narrow kind of ossification that
balances responsiveness with stability in a predictable way. Regulated
agencies can assess a regulation’s staying power—and the
reasonableness of their reliance on that regulation—by assessing the
quality and persuasiveness of the CBA.201 As facts on the ground
change, CBA does not constrain agency responsiveness. And CBA
does not interfere with agency responsiveness during emergency
200. See Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to Inconsistent
Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 (2011). In their model, when judicial
review is too stringent or too deferential, agencies adopt highly partisan positions that are quickly
reversed when a new administration takes control. Within that model, CBA could act like a
commitment device that triggers an intermediate standard of review. If agencies care about the
staying power of their regulations, then they might choose the most preferred CBA-justified
position to trigger an intermediate level of review. If agencies do not support their policies by
CBA, then changes are easy to explain; in other words, judicial review becomes highly deferential.
201. Aaron L. Nielson has recently argued that ossification can promote regulatory
compliance by giving regulated parties some confidence in the regulation’s staying power, making
costly investments worthwhile. See Nielson, supra note 26.
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situations that are governed by statutory or APA procedures. The
APA, for example, allows agencies to cite “good cause” under limited
circumstances to avoid rulemaking procedures.202 Of course, such
interim rules issued without regular procedures are also issued without
CBA. Thus, CBA does not constrain when quick action is needed.
Similarly, as soon as the emergency ends or another administration
takes over, it should be easier to change course because courts will not
be comparing CBAs. This is a good thing. Hasty policies should not be
sticky; only well-reasoned policies should be.
C. Elections with Bounded Consequences
At worst, this Article’s account of CBA might suggest that once
Congress delegates administration of a statute to an agency, agencies
are accountable to no one. Elections, meanwhile, should have
consequences. President Trump was likely elected in part due to his
deregulatory agenda.
Admittedly, the desirability of this account ultimately depends on
one’s beliefs about how the president, Congress, and the public interact
to influence agency action, as well as on one’s theory of democratic
accountability. First, CBA matters only when Congress authorizes
CBA—or, at least, does not prohibit its use.203 CBA then allows for
changes supported by reasoned decisionmaking and transparent policy
differences, affording regulated parties and society valuable
predictability and stability. Nothing in this account of CBA suggests
that elections should not or would not have consequences. Elections
would still have consequences, but they would be moderated by
congressional and societal precommitments to CBA. Even Justice
Rehnquist, concerned about democratic accountability in his partial
dissent in State Farm, argued that “[a] change in administration
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
202. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). Whether that system is optimal is not the focus of this Article.
203. And, I would argue that statutory silence regarding CBA is increasingly likely to be
interpreted as allowing CBA. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (demonstrating
broad support, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, for agency accounting of the welfare
impacts of regulation); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 223–26 (2009)
(interpreting congressional silence regarding the permissibility of considering costs to allow such
consideration); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017) (noting that where CBA is authorized but not required
agencies typically must now provide nonarbitrary reasons for failing to consider CBA); John D.
Graham & Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the Cost-Benefit State, REG. REV. (Apr. 26, 2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Riverkeeper created a default assumption in favor
of CBA).
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reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and
benefits of its programs and regulations[, a]s long as the agency remains
within the bounds established by Congress.”204 CBA-based constraints
are not inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist’s view of the proper role of
presidential influence on agency action. They can be considered the
economic and accounting rules for “reapprais[ing] . . . costs and
benefits” that keep the agency within the bounds established by
Congress under the relevant statute and the APA.205 CBA constrains
the swings, but it is still possible to move the meter a lot.206 And to the
extent that CBA limits the president’s power to implement his or her
preferred policies, it might make the president more likely to work with
Congress to change the relevant underlying laws. This effect would
certainly promote more democratic decisionmaking.
Second, although democratic elections should have consequences,
it does not follow that regulatory policy should swing with the
preferences of the declared winner. As long as the median voter is
unlikely to shift dramatically between elections, this system of CBA
constraints does not result in a rejection of democratic principles.
Rather, CBA may even, on net, enhance democracy through the
transparency and accountability inherent in high-quality CBA-based
decisionmaking. Thus, this Article’s account of CBA is also desirable
under some theories of democracy if resulting policies actually align
more with the median voter’s preferences and improve voter access to
the agency’s reasoning.
D. Undesirable Alternatives
Finally, if CBA truly does raise the cost of changing course via
rulemaking, then does it encourage changing course through other less
visible and less desirable means? This Section addresses two
possibilities in the context of deregulation.207 First, agencies might
204. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
205. There is always a possibility that Congress could specify a different—non CBA-based—
decisionmaking rule for agencies in specific circumstances.
206. Although not necessary to this argument, in my view, society should commit to
constraining regulatory swings.
207. This Section starts from the premise that there exists a regulation that a later
administration would like to modify. This Article, therefore, does not consider the possibility that
agencies might shift to modifying policies by guidance, which is not subject to CBA requirements,
because courts have generally held that agencies are not allowed to modify regulations via
guidance. See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
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justify deregulation based on legal arguments, such as narrower
readings of statutory authority, that get Chevron deference. Second,
agencies might instead achieve deregulation through nonenforcement
of federal law. Both of these critiques are overstated—or can at least
be mitigated.
1. Chevron Slippage. This Article opens by discussing the Trump
administration’s efforts to repeal the CPP. Whatever one thinks of the
Trump EPA’s CBA, the Trump administration is not relying on it to
justify its repeal of the CPP. In fact, EPA argues that its policy change
is actually based on a different interpretation of a statutory provision
underlying the CPP:
EPA proposes a change in the legal interpretation as applied to
section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), on which the CPP was
based, to an interpretation that the Agency proposes is consistent
with the Act’s text, context, structure, purpose, and legislative history,
as well as with Agency’s historical understanding and exercise of its
statutory authority.208

EPA’s new interpretation of the statutory constraints in the Clean
Air Act renders some of the CPP’s requirements outside its authority.
Under administrative law principles, if the relevant agency action
is a legal interpretation of a statute administered by that agency, courts
apply the Chevron doctrine to evaluate the agency’s action. Under the
Chevron doctrine, if the statutory provision is ambiguous (Step One),
then the court defers to any reasonable agency interpretation (Step
Two).209 There are two ways that the Chevron doctrine can be
implicated and applied in this context. The first possibility is that a
narrower interpretation of statutory authority is a Chevron Step One

208. Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia; Amendment
to Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,036 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
209. In Chevron, the Court explained:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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question, available to the agency only if Congress had clearly intended
such an interpretation.210 I do not focus on this possibility because, if
true, the original rulemaking, CBA justified or not, would be
unauthorized by law.211 The second possibility is that Congress did not
address this issue concerning the breadth of the agency’s statutory
authority. In this case, the agency can implement its own interpretation
of its authority as long as that interpretation is permissible, which the
court would analyze under Chevron’s Step Two. Presumably. it would
not matter if the new interpretation leads to an admittedly welfarereducing change in policy—prior or new CBAs notwithstanding—as
long as it is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.
This potential for deference to welfare-reducing policy changes is
problematic. Put simply, it would generate a large difference in the
level of review—Chevron deference versus State Farm’s hard look—
depending on the agency’s description of what it is doing. That
differential could result in an agency painting its policy change in terms
of legal interpretations instead of in terms of its view of the policy’s
effects on society. Such a shift would be undesirable, as it would
sidestep deliberation on the key factual and policy disputes that drive
the agency’s action. For one, it would reduce accountability because
the underlying policy preferences, couched as issues of statutory
interpretation, would be less explicit. Second, it would limit the effect
of debate on the desirability of different policies during the notice-andcomment process. When the agency action is based on an assessment
of costs and benefits, the notice-and-comment feature ensures that
issued regulations reflect deliberative and informed decisionmaking by
eliciting information that could shed light on the relevant effects.
Finally, an agency should have to defend its policy by defending the
goals and the ability of the policy to achieve those goals.
One way to reduce this distortive difference in level of review is to
apply the State Farm analysis under Chevron’s Step Two. In other
words, courts could refuse to give Chevron deference to an

210. This possibility is explored more fully by William W. Buzbee. See William W. Buzbee,
Agency Statutory Abnegation in the Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L.J. 1509 (2019).
211. That said, I would caution the court against finding this level of “clarity” in many of these
contexts. It is difficult to defend the view that in the vast majority of cases, Congress truly had
anything more specific in mind than a desire for the agency to use its expertise to act in the public
interest on some technical issue. That sort of general intention, to the extent it is constitutionally
permissible, is best implemented through CBA. See also discussion supra note 203 (discussing
how the Supreme Court has been more receptive to CBA-based reasoning in the face of statutory
silence).
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interpretation that would not pass muster under the State Farm
analysis. This would force agencies to clearly articulate and defend
policy preferences and—to the extent that these preferences rely on
some faulty or misguided assumptions—allow their policy preferences
to shift based on new information.
The nature of the analysis at Chevron’s Step Two has been the
subject of significant scholarly attention and dispute. Ronald M. Levin
first powerfully proposed merging Chevron’s Step Two with State
Farm.212 In his view, there is no distinct dividing line between agency
interpretation and policymaking that warrants any different
treatment.213 Over the years, some prominent scholars have agreed
with Levin’s argument,214 while others have been hesitant to fully
embrace the simplification.215 Recently, Catherine M. Sharkey has
reinvigorated this proposal in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions.216 Sharkey points to cases such as Judulang v. Holder217 and
Encino Motorcars218 as signaling a “subtle yet momentous shift” toward
implementing State Farm analysis at Chevron’s Step Two.219 In her
restatement, an agency would not get “Chevron deference for its
resolution of ambiguities unless it can articulate a policy basis for that
resolution that can meet the standards of State Farm.”220
If the Supreme Court embraces this limitation on Chevron
deference, then it would close the potential loophole caused by
different standards of review, and that, in turn, would increase
212. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1253, 1263 (1997).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 604 (5th
ed. 2010) (“[T]he question whether an agency engaged in reasoned decision-making within the
meaning of State Farm often is identical to the question a court must answer under step two of
the test announced in Chevron . . .—is an agency’s construction of an ambiguous provision in an
agency-administered statute reasonable?”).
215. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L.
REV. 611, 624–25 (2009); Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1339, 1343 (2017); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95
VA. L. REV. 597, 602 (2009).
216. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORD. L. REV. 2359
(2018).
217. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
218. Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2120 (2016) (holding that an arbitrary and
capricious regulation “receives no Chevron deference”); see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699
(2015) (demonstrating broad support, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, for agency
accounting of the welfare impacts of regulation).
219. Sharkey, supra note 216, at 2368.
220. Id. at 2388–89.
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transparency of policy-based preferences. Applied to the CBA context,
the new Chevron Step Two could be implemented as follows: a court
would decide whether a legal interpretation about statutory authority
is reasonable by looking at the agency’s CBA, which evaluates the
welfare effects of the interpretation. An interpretation based on faulty
or questionable analysis should be deemed an unreasonable one. And,
more controversially, an interpretation that admittedly results in net
costs to society should be more likely to be deemed an unreasonable
one in light of the overall welfare-enhancing purposes of most
statutes.221
In practice, however, courts have generally deferred to agencies
under a broad range of circumstances222—even if the new
interpretation might be less efficient from an economic perspective—
and have rejected a State Farm analysis in some of these cases.223 Many
scholars have noted the increasing disdain for the Chevron doctrine by
members of the Supreme Court. Justice Gorsuch, for example, has
complained that Chevron deference enables an agency to “reverse its
current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on the shift of political
winds and still prevail.”224 Applying State Farm analysis at Chevron’s
Step Two is one way to limit the range of agency discretion by focusing
on the welfare effects of the policy and on the reasonableness of the
underlying factual findings, as summarized in an agency’s CBA. This
focus on CBA would alleviate Justice Gorsuch’s concerns about
Chevron deference, promoting regulatory stability around reasonable
policies through the operation of the CBA-based constraints.225

221. Courts could even define “reasonable” interpretations as those that are net beneficial to
society, as demonstrated by some informal CBA. Admittedly, this application of the Chevron–
State Farm fix might go further than other scholars have suggested.
222. Reversals at Step Two are rare. See, e.g., Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron
in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2017).
223. For example, Catherine M. Sharkey points to Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). The district court had applied a State Farm
analysis at Chevron Step Two, but on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court erred in incorporating the stricter State Farm analysis into its Chevron Step Two analysis.
Id. at 507–08.
224. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
225. This solution, however, might not be appealing to those who oppose Chevron deference
as part of a wider attack on the administrative state due to its perceived threats to individual
liberty and democratic accountability. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017).
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2. Nonenforcement. A related concern is that if agencies cannot
easily modify regulatory stringency because of CBA-based constraints,
they might seek to change the de facto regulatory stringency by altering
their enforcement strategies. According to a rational-actor model,
firms comply with environmental regulations in order to avoid civil and
criminal penalties. In particular, a firm decides whether to comply with
environmental regulations by comparing the expected cost of
compliance with the expected cost of noncompliance—that is, the
probability of detection multiplied by the amount of the penalty. If an
agency wants to make regulations less stringent, it could reduce
enforcement efforts, which might result in less regulatory compliance.
And if an agency wants to make regulations more stringent, it could
increase enforcement efforts, which might result in more regulatory
compliance. Arguably, this is a less desirable approach to changing
regulatory stringency because it is less visible.226
This concern has received much publicity in the context of
environmental regulation. Historically, EPA enforcement has been
sensitive to perceived preferences of the president and Congress.227
More so than in the rulemaking context, presidents and federal
agencies have enjoyed significant discretion when it comes to
enforcement policy. And for good reason—an agency like EPA simply
does not have the resources to comprehensively investigate all entities
under the purview of federal environmental law. This discretion means
that the Trump administration could significantly curtail enforcement
efforts without many legal obstacles. In fact, the administration has
been open about its hands-off approach to federal environmental
enforcement.228

226. Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 128 (2002).
227. JOEL MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 185–202.
228. See, e.g., EPA, FY 2018 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF (May 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-05/documents/fy-2018-budget-in-brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6DZ-UGZP] (calling for significant reductions to EPA’s enforcement
budget); SUSAN PARKER BODINE, INTERIM OECA GUIDANCE ON ENHANCING REGIONALSTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNICATION ON COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE WORK IN
AUTHORIZED STATES (Jan. 2, 2018) (outlining a more hands-off approach to federal
enforcement). A New York Times report analyzing data on EPA-led formal enforcement actions
suggests that this hands-off approach has already been implemented. See Eric Lipton & Danielle
Ivory, Under Trump, E.P.A. Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on
Enforcement Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/JG56-U6DM].
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But environmental enforcement is not that simple. Many
environmental statutes are organized under a principle of “cooperative
federalism,” where the federal government issues national standards
and then works together with states to implement and enforce those
standards. Some statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, outline a
process by which states could seek “authorization” and take control of
implementation and enforcement of environmental regulations.229
Other statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, require states to develop
implementation plans that include enforcement programs.230 Fortyseven states are authorized to enforce the Clean Water Act, and all
states primarily enforce the Clean Air Act.231 While EPA oversees state
enforcement, conducts its own inspections, and brings enforcement
actions in order to encourage consistent regulatory compliance across
states, its efforts are dwarfed by state efforts. Under the Clean Water
Act, for example, EPA has conducted about 4 percent of all inspections
each year for the last eight years.232 And under the Clean Air Act, states
are responsible for about 99 percent of full compliance evaluations.233
In other words, enforcement is primarily driven by states, not by EPA.
What might a change in federal enforcement mean for overall
enforcement? It is difficult to say. On the one hand, given that the
federal government’s role in environmental enforcement has always
been minimal,234 a new, more hands-off approach might seem to have
no effect; states might continue to enforce environmental law as they
please, as they have all along. On the other hand, state enforcement
responds to incentives.235 Studies have demonstrated, for example, that
states tend to skimp on enforcement against facilities when the benefits
229. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
230. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2012).
231. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico are not authorized to enforce the
Clean Water Act. Idaho received authorization to enforce the Clean Water Act in June 2018.
232. See EPA Enforcement and Compliance History Online, Analyze Trends: State Water
Dashboard, https://echo.epa.gov/trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-water-dashboard
[https://perma.cc/5AS5-JGJJ].
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 303–04 (1999); Victor B. Flatt,
A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1998).
235. See, e.g., John Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor and America’s
Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73–81 (1997); Eric Helland, The Revealed Preferences of
State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 242, 258–
60 (1998); Hilary Sigman, Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental
Policies, 50 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 82, 83–84 (2005).
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of increased compliance accrue to other states.236 To the extent that it
gives states freedom to allocate their enforcement resources at their
discretion, a hands-off federal enforcement policy could exacerbate
these and other tendencies.237 In other words, a policy of federal
underenforcement might give states more freedom to enforce federal
environmental law according to their preferences.238 To those that
generally prefer state control in this area, this might be a good thing.
Instead of a focus on consistency, it might allow states to better tailor
regulations to local conditions and enhance the net benefits of federal
regulation. To those generally skeptical of state control, this might not
be a good thing. It could make capture by powerful local interests more
likely or exacerbate exposures to environmental harms faced by
disadvantaged groups.
Presidential and agency enforcement discretion is unlikely to go
away. To the extent that CBA-based constraints encourage more
drastic uses of enforcement discretion, there are other relevant
actors—such as the public, nongovernmental organizations, and
insurers—that constrain the overall effectiveness of this strategy. That
is, notwithstanding any overall effect of such a policy on enforcement,
there might still not be much effect on compliance. These actors can
influence compliance through citizen suits, which are authorized under
many environmental statutes; other litigation based on state common
law; public pressure, especially if significant regulatory noncompliance
is visible; and market-based drivers toward regulatory compliance,
such as incentives to obtain lower insurance premiums.239
CONCLUSION
CBA was once considered a tool for implementing conservative
regulatory policies, in part because benefits—which could justify

236. See Sigman, supra note 235.
237. See generally Caroline Cecot, Filling the Federal Enforcement Gap, 33 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 36 (2019) (discussing how lower federal enforcement might affect state enforcement
levels).
238. There might be some contexts in which states prefer to have a strong federal enforcement
policy. As Cynthia Giles recently articulated, a credible federal enforcement threat might
motivate companies to proactively work with states toward compliance because “if they don’t
resolve their enforcement problems at the state level, they may have to face the EPA instead.”
Cynthia Giles, Why We Can’t Just Leave Environmental Protection to the States, GRIST (Apr. 26,
2017), https://grist.org/opinion/why-we-cant-just-leave-environmental-protection-to-the-states/
[https://perma.cc/BS7N-EQBS].
239. See Cecot, supra note 237, at 38–39.
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increasing the stringency of regulations—were difficult to monetize. As
advancements have been made in monetization, CBA has shed some
of its conservative associations and achieved more nonpartisan
support. In fact, when the analysis is deployed thoughtfully, this Article
argues that CBA—a limit on irrational government action—is as much
a limit on deregulation as it is a limit on regulation. Indeed, CBA might
be the unlikely champion for many progressives seeking to derail the
Trump administration’s deregulatory agenda and to preserve at least
some of the Obama administration’s regulatory legacy. If any rules are
vulnerable to modification, repeal, or replacement, it is rules that were
not supported by thorough CBAs.
This Article argues that the increased acceptance of CBA should
be applauded by all, regardless of political affiliation. In particular,
recognition of the potential stabilizing influence of CBA on agency
decisionmaking should incentivize more thorough analysis, more
research into accurate assessments of costs and benefits, and
appropriate retrospective review of existing regulations. Although
broad delegations to agencies may reduce political accountability,
society can also reap benefits from expertise and flexibility. CBA
works well to ensure that we fully utilize agency expertise while still
providing flexibility to respond to real changing conditions and values.
And it does so while promoting accountability in this system by making
presidential oversight and CBA-bounded control easier—especially
when values play an important role in policymaking—and by forcing
decisions to be transparent. Ultimately, by encouraging rational
decisionmaking and reasonable updating, CBA and judicial review of
CBA promotes predictability and plays a desirable role in stabilizing
regulatory policy across presidential administrations.

